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POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND FINLAND 
Christopher M. Johnson* 
In 2011, two murder cases involving defendants who professed their innocence 
came to dramatic conclusions in appellate courts.1  In Finland in August 2011, the 
murder prosecution of Anneli Auer ended2 with her acquittal by an appellate court.3  
In the United States in September 2011, the murder prosecution of Troy Davis 
ended with his execution in Georgia’s death chamber, despite exculpatory 
information developed after his trial about the reliability of some eyewitness 
identification evidence.4 
The Finnish case arose out of the December 2006 death of Jukka Lahti in 
Ulvila.5  His wife, Auer, called the police and claimed that an intruder entered their 
house and attacked her husband.6  After an investigation, the police charged Auer, 
accusing her of having staged the break-in.7  The Georgia case arose out of the 
shooting death of Savannah police officer Mark MacPhail on August 19, 1989.8  
The shooting happened shortly after midnight, near a bus station and Burger King 
at which MacPhail worked as a security guard.9  A disturbance had begun outside a 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law, and Chief Appellate Defender, 
New Hampshire Public Defender.  J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1994; M.A.L.D., Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1994; B.A. Carleton College, 1989.  I am much 
indebted to Anna-Liisa Autio, Juha Lavapuro, Jussi Tapani, Mikko Vuorenpää and my other colleagues 
during a Fulbright-supported semester in the Law Faculty at the University of Turku for their generous 
help in introducing me to the Finnish criminal justice system, and to the many colleagues in the Public 
Defender and at the University of New Hampshire School of Law who have aided in the preparation of 
this article. 
 1. Actually, of course, more than two murder cases came to dramatic conclusions in appellate 
courts in 2011.  Perhaps the best-known case involved Amanda Knox, an American convicted of murder 
in Italy, and acquitted in an appellate court in 2011.  See NINA BURLEIGH, THE FATAL GIFT OF BEAUTY: 
THE TRIALS OF AMANDA KNOX (2011). 
 2. Subject, however, to a prosecution appeal to a higher appellate court. 
 3. Prosecutors Still Investigating Anneli Auer Despite Initial Murder Acquittal, HELSINGIN 
SANOMAT, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Prosecutors+still+investigating+ 
Anneli+Auer+despite+initial+murder+acquittal/1135268863652. 
 4. Colleen Curry & Michael S. James, Troy Davis Executed After Stay Denied by Supreme Court, 
ABC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/troy-davis-executed-stay-denied-supreme-
court/story?id=14571862.  See also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 
2010) (describing facts of case), appeal dismissed 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 
1787 (2011). 
 5. Wife Found Guilty of Killing Her Husband in Long-Running Ulvila Homicide Case, HELSINGIN 
SANomat, June 23, 2010, http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Wife+found+guilty+of+killing+ 
her+husband+in+long-running+Ulvila+homicide+case/1135258088101.  A Finnish language story 
about the case appears at http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/2011062613861464_uu.shtml. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Ga. 2008). 
 9. Id. 
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pool hall, during which a man was beaten.10  MacPhail went to the scene in 
response to a call for help, and there encountered several people, one of whom shot 
him three times.11  The prosecution contended that Davis shot MacPhail.  Davis 
maintained his innocence, arguing that another person committed the crime.12 
This article does not examine the facts of either case, and thus ventures no 
opinion on Auer’s or Davis’s guilt.  Depending on the evidence, one could 
conclude that justice was served in both Finland and the United States, or in one 
country but not the other, or in neither.  Rather, this article compares the different 
conceptions of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions illustrated by the 
two cases. 
In Finland, the appellate process afforded Auer a de novo reconsideration of 
the question of her guilt, without requiring a prior showing of procedural error in 
the trial.  In the United States, a federal district court did receive new evidence on 
the issue of Davis’s guilt, acting under an extraordinary ruling from the United 
States Supreme Court,13 but in doing so held Davis to a high burden of proof with 
respect to his innocence.14  In the United States, a principle of deference to the trial 
jury’s judgment as to the facts operates to prevent any subsequent reviewing court 
from undertaking a de novo re-examination of the case against Davis.  In the 
United States, a truly de novo inquiry into his guilt would occur only at a second 
trial, and an American appellate court would order such a trial only upon finding 
some defect in the first trial. 
Observers have noted the “relative lack of scholarly attention paid to the 
institutional role of appellate courts in the criminal context.”15  Comparative studies 
of criminal appellate procedure are “virtually non-existent.”16  In an effort to 
contribute to closing that gap in the scholarship, this article undertakes a 
comparative investigation of the Finnish and American systems of post-trial 
judicial review of criminal convictions.  By means of that comparison, the article 
seeks to understand the underlying assumptions and practical implications of two 
differing conceptions of the role of the post-trial juridical review of criminal 
convictions.  The task of comparative description is facilitated by the fact that, to a 
significant extent, information about the Finnish legal system is available in the 
English language.17 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Curry & James, supra note 4. 
 13. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009). 
 14. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (describing facts of 
case), appeal dismissed 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1787 (2011). 
 15. Chad M. Oldfather & Michael M. O’Hear, Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 339, 339 (2009). 
 16. Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
1, 2 (2011). 
 17. An excellent database for Finnish statutory and case law is Finlex, available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/.  English (and other foreign language) translations of many important statutes 
are available, and the site links to Finnish case law, although decisions are reported only in Finnish and 
Swedish on that site.  A collection of English-language abstracts of selected Finnish appellate opinions 
is available in the Dombase database administered by the Institute for Human Rights: 
http://trip.abo.fi/aadb/dombase/dombaseen.htm.  Citations to Finnish judicial opinion abbreviate the 
name of the court and give numbers indicating the year and docket number of the case.  The 
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Before turning to that task, it is necessary to define some terms and note some 
limitations of the argument.  The article focuses on post-trial judicial review of 
criminal convictions.  Except to the extent necessary to the description and 
comparison of the two systems of post-trial judicial review, the article thus does not 
examine other important aspects of Finland’s and America’s criminal adjudication 
systems.  It does not examine the trial processes that produce a criminal conviction 
in the first instance.  Important differences distinguish trial procedures in the two 
countries, but a detailed analysis of those difference falls outside the scope of the 
present article. 
Also, the article does not examine post-trial, non-judicial forms of review of a 
criminal conviction.  In the United States, an officer or agency typically housed in 
the executive branch of government has authority to pardon or grant clemency to 
convicted persons.18  In Finland, the President holds the pardon power.19  Such 
extra-judicial forms of review of criminal convictions warrant comparative 
attention, but this article leaves that task for another day. 
The phrase, “post-trial judicial review,” also requires some explanation, as it is 
not in common use in either country to denote any phase of the review of a criminal 
conviction.  American law divides what this article refers to collectively as “post-
trial judicial review” into three phases for state prisoners (direct appeal, state post-
conviction review or collateral attack, and federal habeas corpus), and two phases 
for federal prisoners (direct appeal and habeas corpus).  One cannot, with complete 
fidelity to the American distinction between trial and appellate courts, call the 
collective “appellate review,” because aspects of the review involve hearings in 
trial-level courts.  Also, the latter two phases often take the form of a new lawsuit 
challenging the prisoner’s continued confinement, rather than an appeal of the prior 
conviction.  Finnish law also has three phases of judicial review: an initial appeal 
through the hierarchy of courts; an “extraordinary review” that begins either in the 
intermediate court of appeals or the Supreme Court; and under some circumstances, 
review in an international court. 
Part I examines that architecture of the appellate process—the sequence and 
hierarchy of the courts engaged in the post-trial judicial review of a conviction.  In 
that regard, Finland and the United States share some notable similarities.  In one 
significant respect, though, the architecture of judicial review differs in the two 
countries.  Because of the country’s federal structure, American post-trial judicial 
review of state prisoner convictions can involve the presentation of the same claim 
                                                                                                                 
abbreviations are as follows:  “KKO” refers to the Finnish Supreme Court, the korkein oikeus; “I-SHO” 
refers to the Itä-Suomen Hovioikeus, or Eastern Finland Court of Appeals; “HelHO” refers to the 
Helsinki Court of Appeals; “RHO” refers to the Rovaniemi Court of Appeals; “KouHO” refers to the 
Kouvola Court of Appeals; “VaaHO” refers to the Vaasa Court of Appeals. 
 18. A number of articles discuss aspects of an executive pardon power.  See, e.g., Kristen H. 
Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651 (2008); Harold J. Krent, Conditioning 
the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (2001); Lauren Schorr, Breaking 
into the Pardon Power: Congress and the Office of the Pardon Attorney, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535 
(2009);; Note, Executive Revision of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2020 (1996). 
 19. The pardon power has recently come under review in Finland.   
Niinistö willing to abolish presidential pardon for criminals, HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Feb. 20, 2011, 
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Niinist%C3%B6+willing+to+abolish+presidential+pardon+for+criminal
s/1135270069867. 
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in both state and federal courts.  Lacking a federal structure of government, Finland 
does not make available two different sets of courts for the review of criminal 
convictions.  However, because of its status as a signatory to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, prisoners challenging their Finnish criminal 
convictions on the grounds of a violation of the Convention can take the case to a 
separate judicial authority, the European Court of Human Rights.  Also, because of 
Finland’s membership in the European Union, a Finnish prisoner can, under some 
circumstances as described below, challenge a conviction in the European Court of 
Justice. 
Part II examines the history of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions 
in each country.  Finland’s criminal justice system has been much influenced by the 
continental civil law tradition.  America’s, of course, developed in the common law 
tradition.  The right to appeal a criminal conviction arose at different times in each 
tradition, in response to different impulses.20  The origin and timing of the 
development of the right to appeal in the United States led to a conception of 
appeal as limited by the prerogatives of the jury.  No such parallel development 
occurred in Finland.  That fact marks a second significant distinction between the 
conceptions of appeal in the two countries. 
Part III explores the nature of the inquiry undertaken in post-trial judicial 
review of criminal convictions in the two countries.  The article divides that Part 
into sub-parts by reference to two broad decisional strategies available to reviewing 
courts: assessing or avoiding the merits of the prisoner’s claim. 
In Finland, a principal ground for appeal is that the conviction is substantively 
unjust, in that the prosecution failed to demonstrate the defendant’s guilt.  In the 
United States, defects in trial structure or procedure commonly form the basis for 
post-trial judicial review, with challenges to the substantive justice of the 
conviction figuring less prominently.  In both countries, exceptions exist; certain 
procedural issues can form the basis for a Finnish challenge to a conviction, and 
American prisoners can seek relief on substantive grounds.  However, in Finland, 
the scope for procedurally-based appeals is relatively narrow, and in the United 
States, claims focusing directly on the adequacy of the proof of guilt are subject to 
conditions that prevent post-trial judicial review from undertaking a de novo 
reconsideration of guilt.  That difference in the focus of post-trial judicial review 
constitutes a significant distinction between the conceptions of appeal in the two 
countries. 
The second section of Part III examines non-merits-based grounds for 
resolving criminal appeals.  In the United States, waiver doctrines proliferate and, 
when applicable, have the effect of allowing a conviction to be affirmed without 
regard either to the substantive justice of the conviction or the procedural regularity 
of the trial.  In Finland, some waiver doctrines exist, but they are considerably less 
prevalent than in the United States.  That difference constitutes another significant 
distinction between the conceptions of appeal in the two countries. 
Part IV concludes the article by examining the collective significance of such 
distinctions.  What does the comparison reveal about American priorities and goals 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 4-14 (describing the history). 
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vis-à-vis criminal adjudication?  What does the comparison reveal about Finnish 
goals and priorities?  In 1939, Roscoe Pound wrote that: 
It would seem that where life or liberty is at stake, as in a criminal 
prosecution, a rational re-examination of the whole case after trial, at least 
at the instance of a convicted accused, to be made by a tribunal insuring 
the best judicial power in the jurisdiction, in order to insure that justice has 
been done, would be a matter of course. . . .  In the English-speaking 
world we have been slow in coming to the conception of review of a 
conviction suggested above, and in the United States we have still much 
of the way to go.  In our traditional legal system we have hardly become 
aware of the end, although the public often assumes that review and 
affirmance by an appellate tribunal is an assurance that the merits of a 
conviction have been passed upon and that guilt of the accused has been 
established by the judgment of the highest court.21 
By means of comparative analysis, this article seeks to discern how much farther 
we have come in the seven decades since Pound wrote those words. 
Ultimately, the article proposes that the Finnish system manifests a relatively 
greater trust than the American system in the decisional expertise of the judges 
entrusted with the power of appellate review of criminal convictions.  The 
American system, by contrast, seeks to preserve the privileged position of the jury.  
It embodies a relatively greater trust in the decisional expertise of that trial court 
fact-finder and a correlatively greater suspicion about the appellate courts.  Second, 
the Finnish system of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions manifests a 
more single-minded pursuit of the goal of achieving an accurate verdict, as 
measured by its reflection of the truth of the facts underlying the accusation.  While 
the American system unquestionably values accurate verdicts, it also pursues other 
goals to the extent of compromising the pursuit of factual truth.  These include, to a 
greater extent that the Finnish system, the goals of preserving public confidence in 
the criminal adjudication system and controlling that system’s costs. 
I.  THE ARCHITECTURE OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
When completely invoked by a defendant convicted, like Davis, in a state 
court, the American system of post-trial judicial review involves at least two trips 
through the hierarchy of state trial and appellate-level courts with the opportunity, 
at the end of each trip, to seek review by the United States Supreme Court.22  The 
first trip, the “direct appeal,” involves the presentation of issues raised before or 
during trial, or in some instances, at a post-trial but pre-direct appeal motion for a 
new trial.  The second trip, “state post-conviction review,” typically involves the 
presentation of claims not already litigated in the direct appeal process.  Finally, 
and usually after both direct appeal and state post-conviction review, the state 
prisoner may, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursue an appeal 
through the hierarchy of federal courts.  For defendants convicted in federal court, 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 3 (1939). 
 22. The qualification “at least” reflects the fact that some convicted defendants file more than one 
state post-conviction petition and/or more than one federal habeas petition.  Such repeat petitions are 
referred to as “successive” petitions. 
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the opportunities for post-trial judicial review include two trips through the federal 
courts, the first on direct appeal, and the second in habeas corpus. 
If, in any phase of post-trial judicial review, the prisoner prevails, the 
conviction is vacated.  In some relatively rare instances, the nature of the prisoner’s 
successful claim bars the prosecution from bringing the charge again in a second 
trial.23  On other occasions, the prosecutor could retry the case, but chooses not to.  
Probably most often, successful appeals are followed by reprosecution on the same 
charge.  In the event of conviction after a second trial, the reconvicted prisoner may 
pursue a second appeal through all the same channels. 
In its basic structure, the Finnish system of post-trial judicial review will not 
strike an American lawyer as markedly unfamiliar.  Criminal prosecutions begin in 
a trial court.24  Both the State and the defendant have the right to appeal the trial 
court judgment to an intermediate court of appeal.25  The Finnish Supreme Court 
has discretion to determine which cases it hears on appeal.26  Because of its 
structural similarity to American direct appeal, this article will refer to that first 
phase of Finnish post-trial judicial review as the Finnish direct appeal. 
Also, like the United States, Finland provides for judicial review of criminal 
convictions after the end of that direct appeal.27  Under that provision, a convicted 
person, who has become aware of perjury affecting the case or of new evidence 
tending to show the person’s innocence, may file a petition in the intermediate 
court of appeal or Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the conviction.28  At the 
hearing on such a petition, the petitioner may seek to present new information.29  If 
the court finds the petitioner’s claim to have merit, the court may either order a 
retrial or enter judgment for the prisoner without a retrial.30  Using the English 
label assigned by the translators of the relevant Finnish statute, this article refers to 
that phase of Finnish post-trial judicial review as “extraordinary review.” 
While Finland does not operate separate state and federal criminal courts, 
Finnish convictions can, under some circumstances, be reviewed in an international 
court, either the European Court of Human Rights or the European Court of 
Justice.31  Although from time to time American convictions come before 
                                                                                                                 
 23. A finding that the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence of guilt or violated the guarantee 
of a speedy trial, for example, would preclude re-trial. 
 24. 7/1734 Oikeudenkäymiskaari, ch. 1, § 1 (2011) [hereinafter Code of Judicial Procedure].  The 
English translation is available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1734/en17340004.pdf and the 
Finnish at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1734/17340004000.  In the English translation, the trial 
court is referred to as the district court; in Finnish, the trial court is the käräjäoikeus. 
 25. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 1.  In Finnish, the intermediate court of 
appeal is called hovioikeus. 
 26. Id. ch. 30, §§ 1, 2(1).  In Finnish, the Supreme Court is called korkein oikeus. 
 27. Id. ch. 31. 
 28. Id. ch. 31, §§ 2(1), 5, 8.  For cases invoking this procedure, see, for example, KKO 2009:84 and 
KKO 2008:24. 
 29. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, § 5. 
 30. Id. ch. 31, §§ 6, 14.  See also, e.g., KKO 2009:84 (noting that the court of appeal held oral 
hearing, reassessed the evidence, and entered conviction, thereby altering the trial court’s judgment of 
acquittal). 
 31. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
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international courts,32 such appeals do not now form a regular part of American 
post-conviction review, and the decisions of international courts are not generally 
regarded as enforceable by American courts.33 
In Finland and in the United States, choices about the architecture of post-trial 
judicial review reflect two principal concerns: the first relating to the fundamental 
purpose of post-trial judicial review, and the second relating to functional and 
structural constraints on the courts responsible for conducting post-trial judicial 
review.  First, in both countries, post-trial judicial review aims to ensure that lower 
courts reliably find facts and faithfully and consistently apply the governing law.  
The architecture of post-trial judicial review serves that goal by providing the 
oversight sufficient to hold trial courts accountable for their decisions.  Second, 
both countries have specific understandings about the functions properly performed 
by the various courts engaged in post-trial judicial review.  Those understandings 
bear on the architecture of post-trial judicial review.  In the United States, for 
example, the capacity to receive evidence is allocated exclusively to trial-level 
courts, while in Finland, appellate courts also have that capacity.  Also, concepts of 
the proper jurisdiction of courts can influence the architecture, as manifested for 
example in the decisional specialization associated with federalism.  This article 
thus organizes its comparison of the architecture by reference to those two features. 
A.  The Goal of Review: Accountability Through Judicial Hierarchy 
Within the Finnish direct appeal, the trial court—appeals court—Supreme 
Court sequence of review reflects a simple hierarchy of authority.  Review in the 
intermediate court of appeal affords a forum in which the judgment of the trial 
court can be reviewed.  Discretionary review in the Supreme Court affords the legal 
system an option for correction of error in the appeals court.  In granting the power 
of discretionary review to the highest court, Finnish law allows that highest court of 
appeal to concentrate on cases of great or general importance.  The American 
system features the same hierarchy of authority, responsive to the same concern to 
enable multiple opportunities for review, without requiring the judicial system to 
accept for full review every case at every level of court. 
Two justifications could be advanced for the multiple opportunities for review 
implicit in the creation of an appellate court hierarchy.  First, one could argue that 
the cumulative process enriches the analysis such that, by the time the case reaches 
the higher courts, the prior work of lower courts improves the quality of the later 
courts’ decisions.  At times, the United States Supreme Court has vouched for that 
benefit of repetitive review.34 
Second, one might argue that higher courts make better decisions than lower 
courts, for reasons relating to their staffing or workload.  For example, the process 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See, e.g., Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31); LaGrand 
Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 33. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516 (2008) (“[N]either Medellin nor his amici have 
identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.”). 
 34. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 399 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Premature 
resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative 
principles.”). 
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of collective decision-making characteristic of appellate courts may produce better 
decisions than can be made by a single trial judge.35  Also, insofar as higher courts 
decide fewer cases than lower courts, higher court judges may have more time to 
spend per case.  Associated with that greater capacity for focus is the fact that 
higher courts also tend to have to decide a smaller number of disputed issues per 
case than do lower courts, insofar as not every decision made by a trial judge is 
appealed, and not every ruling of an intermediate court of appeal is accepted for 
review by the highest, discretionary review courts. 
Some of these latter considerations seem less applicable to Finland than to the 
United States.  The process of collective decision-making takes place in Finnish 
trial courts on questions of law, insofar as lay and professional judges deliberate 
together on all issues, including legal issues.36  Moreover, in some cases, multiple 
professional judges preside together at a trial.37  American trial courts, via juries, 
engage in collective decision-making on issues of fact, but juries do not decide 
issues of law and the concept of having multiple judges preside together on a trial 
is foreign to modern American practice.38 
In both countries, one also finds evidence of the belief that higher courts make 
better decisions even when not preceded and informed by a lower court 
examination of the case.  In the United States, for example, some states provide 
that certain cases will proceed directly from a trial court to the state Supreme 
Court, thereby bypassing the intermediate court of appeals.39  In Finland, a prisoner 
who petitions for extraordinary review after direct appeal files that petition not in 
the trial court, but in the appeals court or Supreme Court.40 
In one respect, the Finnish system of hierarchical review constrains trial courts 
in their fact-finding capacity more than does the American system.  At the 
conclusion of a Finnish criminal trial, the fact-finder must explain in writing the 
reasoning supporting the verdict.41  An American jury has no such obligation, but 
rather merely announces the verdict.  Indeed, by various devices American law 
seeks to protect jury verdicts from challenges on the grounds of incoherence.42  The 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 16, at 29, 31 (citing references from South Africa and New 
Zealand attesting to the value of collective decision-making processes). 
 36. 689/1997 Laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa, ch. 10, § 4 (2002) [hereinafter Criminal 
Procedure Act], available at http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1997/en19970689.pdf (English 
translation). 
 37. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 2, § 1. 
 38. It has not always been this way.  In some early trials, more than one professional judge presided.  
See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken 
Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26, 83-88 (1978) (discussing trial brought on 
charges arising from the “Fries Rebellion” in Eastern Pennsylvania, over which presided two judges).  
The practice of using multiple judges at certain American trials survived in places into the twentieth 
century.  See, e.g., IRVING MORRIS, THE RAPE CASE: A YOUNG LAWYER’S STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN 
THE 1950’S, at 35 (2011) (noting that three judges presided on capital trials in Delaware as late as the 
1940’s).   
 39. See, e.g., Cecilia Rasmussen, Oversight Led to Automatic Appeals in Death Row Cases, L.A. 
TIMES (June 17, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/17/local/me-then17. 
 40. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 31, §§ 2, 12, 14a. 
 41. Id. ch. 21, § 3(1); Criminal Procedure Act, supra note 36, ch. 11, § 4(1). 
 42. One such rule obliges appellate courts to affirm inconsistent verdicts.  See generally Eric L. 
Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
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absence of an explanation for the verdict leaves post-trial reviewing courts in the 
position of deferring to a verdict if any rational jury could have reached it.43  It 
matters not whether the actual jury, in reaching the verdict, followed a logical line 
of reasoning. 
B.  Functional Specialization: Evidence and Federalism 
The architecture of post-trial judicial review can also reflect concepts of 
courts’ functional specialization.  This article notes two kinds of functional 
specialization.  The first involves the competence to take evidence, and the second 
involves federalism and its implications for courts’ competence to decide different 
kinds of legal issues.  In respect both to evidence and federalism, one finds in 
Finland less functional specialization within post-trial judicial review than one 
finds in the United States. 
1.  Evidence 
In Finland, the trial court does not have a monopoly on the authority to receive 
evidence.  Rather, litigants can present evidence, at least in the discretion of the 
court, in both the intermediate court of appeals and in the Supreme Court.44  
Moreover, in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, the parties are not limited to re-
presenting on appeal the same evidence presented in the trial court; rather, new 
evidence may also be presented on appeal.45 
In 2010, evidently in an effort to conserve the resources of the court of 
appeals, the Finnish parliament passed a statute empowering the court of appeals 
more often to forego the oral evidentiary hearing.46  For example, as of January 1, 
2011, a person sentenced to four months or less of imprisonment must apply to the 
court of appeals for permission to appeal.47  The new law does not, however, 
change the fact that, when it hears evidence on appeal, the court of appeals decides 
the case de novo. 
By contrast, the American system differentiates by function among the courts 
engaged in post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions.  Perhaps the most 
notable instance involves the rule restricting the presentation of evidence to trial-
                                                                                                                 
771 (1998).  Another bars post-trial reviewing courts from admitting juror testimony for the purpose of 
impeaching a verdict.  See generally Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework 
for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469 (2006). 
 43. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 44. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 24, § 15(1).  Until recently, a Finnish appellate 
court generally had to hold an oral hearing when the prisoner so requested.  See KKO 2000:62.  An 
appellate court need not hold an oral hearing, though, if the appellant raises only a legal claim, see 
VaaHO 1996:4, or if such a hearing is clearly unnecessary, see KKO 2002:15.  Under a recent statute 
not yet translated into English, the appeals court has greater authority than formerly to decline to hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  See 650/2010 Laki oikeudenkäymiskaaren muuttamisesta, ch. 25a, available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2010/20100650. 
 45. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 25, § 17 (prohibiting introduction of new 
evidence in civil cases only, unless the proponent can show cause for failure to present the evidence in 
the trial court). 
 46. See 650/2010 Laki oikeudenkäymiskaaren muuttamisesta, ch. 25a. 
 47. Id. § 6. 
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level courts, to the exclusion of appellate courts.  Because only trial-level courts 
receive evidence, their fact-findings are treated with deference by appellate courts, 
in the sense of being deemed correct unless clearly erroneous.48  Trial courts have 
no exclusive prerogative with respect to questions of law, and so appellate courts 
do not examine trial court legal rulings subject to any deferential standard of 
review.49 
In some states, in the case of minor crimes, a defendant has the opportunity 
first to have a bench trial in a misdemeanor court.50  Upon conviction in that court, 
the defendant often can appeal the case to a trial de novo before a jury in a higher 
court.  While such provisions allow for the de novo reconsideration of the question 
of guilt, they exist only in the case of relatively minor crimes, and the appeal takes 
the case from a judge to a jury.  In the case of more serious crimes, where by virtue 
of the case’s beginning in a jury court the appeal would take the case from a jury to 
a judge, no opportunity for de novo review exists.  The United States is not unique 
in this quality of offering a de novo appeal to a second trial only in the case of 
minor crimes,51 but it is revealing that the opportunity for de novo appeal of fact 
should be reserved for circumstances in which a jury is the reviewing body. 
In Finland, because appellate courts can receive evidence, appellate review of 
the factual issues raised on appeal is de novo.52  That is, the Finnish appellate 
courts need not defer to trial court judgments on identical issues.  However, in 
practice, a certain kind of deference may exist.  Because of the passage of time 
between trial and appeal, it can happen that the quality of the evidence degrades by 
the time of the appellate court’s hearing.  However, even when the court of appeals 
affirms the decision of the trial court, quite often appeals court judges feel that the 
hearing in the appeals court has been useful, because it has made the case more 
clear.53 
Nothing about the American system necessarily requires a functional 
differentiation between trial and appellate level courts in regards to the receipt or 
consideration of evidence.54  Although the Constitution guarantees the right to trial 
by jury, that guarantee does not preclude the empowerment of appellate courts to 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991). 
 49. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996).  For a trenchant criticism of the 
extent to which appellate courts now defer to trial court fact-finding, see Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate 
Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437 (2004). 
 50. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 599:1 (2011). 
 51. Although it lacks juries, Egypt otherwise seems to share the feature of allowing a de novo 
appeal to a higher trial court only in cases involving minor charges.  See Sadiq Reza, Egypt, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 133, 144 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2009). 
 52. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 24, ch. 24, §§ 15-16 (describing decisional procedure of 
court of appeals, without reference to any principle of deference to the trial court); Id. § 19 (providing 
that except as otherwise specified, the provisions governing a decision in trial court apply also in court 
of appeals); Id. ch. 26 (governing procedure for hearing case in court of appeals; in particular section 
15). 
 53. I am indebted to Anna-Liisa Autio, who has worked as a refendary in the Turku Court of 
Appeals, for this observation. 
 54. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470 (noting prevalence in 1930’s of proposals for appellate review 
of facts underlying convictions). 
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review factual findings.55  Moreover, scholars have argued that appellate courts 
have the competence to engage in a high-quality review of factual determinations 
made by juries.56 
In the 1930’s, “proposals for appellate review of the facts underlying 
convictions were prevalent.”57  At that time, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti had 
focused national and international attention on the risk of fact-finding error in 
American criminal prosecutions.58  Under present circumstances, a reform allowing 
American appellate courts to receive evidence seems inconceivable, if only because 
the American judicial system is understood to be struggling to cope with its 
caseload, and any proposal that could substantially increase the amount of time 
devoted to a large number of cases will be seen as impossible to implement in 
practice.59  However, scholars have made renewed calls for less deferential 
appellate review of jury fact-finding.60 
A few conclusions emerge.  First, it would seem impossible in practice for the 
American system to abandon its exclusive assignment to trial courts of the capacity 
to receive evidence.  That functional specialization may or may not be a virtue, but 
it is certainly a necessity under present American conditions.  The blunt reality of 
costs here constrains the American system more than the Finnish. 
Second, the evidentiary exclusivity of trial courts encourages American 
appellate courts to defer to trial court findings of fact.  Professor Oldfather and 
others have persuasively argued that appellate courts have the capacity to review 
trial court findings of fact with skill and insight.61  In some respects, appellate 
courts have tools that potentially make them superior to jurors as fact-finders, 
including written transcripts and the experience of involvement in many cases.  The 
fact that American appellate courts afford much less deference to jury fact-finding 
in civil cases demonstrates that, at some level, American appellate courts believe in 
their fact-finding competence.62  Nevertheless, as discussed in further detail below, 
post-trial judicial review in America is characterized by the substantial deference 
afforded by post-trial reviewing courts to trial court fact-finding.  American 
appeals, therefore, operate under a constraint with regard to fact finding that 
Finnish appeals avoid.  Depending on one’s view of whether appellate courts, if 
permitted freer review, will create or correct more errors, deference would improve 
or impair the capacity of post-trial judicial review to ensure that justice is done in 
individual cases.63 
                                                                                                                 
 55. For an argument defending the constitutionality of de novo appellate review of facts, see Keith 
A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 619 (2009). 
 56. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470. 
 57. Id. 
 58. For an excellent recent review of the case, see BRUCE WATSON, SACCO & VANZETTI: THE MEN, 
THE MURDERS, AND THE JUDGMENT OF MANKIND (2007). 
 59. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 470-71. 
 60. Findley, supra note 55, at 618-23. 
 61. Oldfather, supra note 49.  See also generally Findley, supra note 55. 
 62. Oldfather, supra note 49, at 494-502. 
 63. Id. at 483-84. 
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2.  Federalism. 
A second form of functional specialization of the courts engaged in post-trial 
judicial review involves not the review of factual findings, but rather the review of 
legal conclusions.  Finland is not a federal republic, and it operates a unified system 
of criminal courts, applying a unified body of criminal law.64  By contrast, the 
United States operates coordinate criminal justice systems, with each state and the 
federal government defining and enforcing its own criminal laws.  Because the 
United States Constitution imposes a variety of restrictions on the states in regards 
to criminal law and procedure, in the case of persons prosecuted under state 
authority, two bodies of law apply.  Because both state law and federal 
constitutional law apply in such cases, their post-trial judicial review can reach 
both state and federal courts. 
In the United States, state courts must apply not only controlling principles of 
state law, but also controlling principles of federal constitutional law.  Federal 
habeas courts have narrower jurisdiction, in the sense that they have no authority, 
in the context of the review of state criminal convictions, to decide a prisoner’s 
state law claims.65  Their jurisdiction, rather, extends only to federal law claims.66  
Moreover, even with regard to federal law claims, the federal habeas courts can 
review such claims only if the state prisoner has first presented them in the state 
courts.67 
Further substantive restrictions on federal habeas review exist.  Federal habeas 
courts are barred from adjudicating certain kinds of claims of violation of federal 
constitutional rights.  In Stone v. Powell,68 the Supreme Court held that federal 
habeas courts cannot adjudicate claims of violation of the Fourth Amendment if the 
prisoner had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the claim in the state courts.69  
In so ruling, the Court focused on the “judicially created” nature of the 
exclusionary rule.70  Through use of the exclusionary rule, courts have sought to 
promote police compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure 
regulations by excluding from criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of 
those regulations.71 
The use of the exclusionary rule as a mechanism for promoting police 
compliance with search and arrest regulations constitutes a characteristic feature of 
American criminal adjudication.72  The exclusionary rule has its critics,73 and their 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See 39/1889 Rikoslaki (2008) [hereinafter Criminal Code of Finland], available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf (English translation). 
 65. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). 
 66. Id. at 68. 
 67. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). 
 68. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 69. Id. at 481-82. 
 70. Id. at 482. 
 71. Id. at 486 (“The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police 
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
 72. It is not, though, unique to the United States.  Some other countries employ an exclusionary rule 
to varying extents for a similar purpose.  See, e.g., Binyamin Blum, Doctrines Without Borders: The 
“New” Israeli Exclusionary Rule and the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131 
(2008); Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983); Margaret 
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most fundamental point is that the exclusionary rule deprives courts of reliable 
evidence tending to prove a defendant’s guilt.  In Justice Cardozo’s famous 
formulation, the exclusionary rule suffers the defect that the criminal “may go free 
because the constable has blundered.”74 
Finland does not use an exclusionary rule as the standard remedy for violations 
by the police of the rules governing criminal investigation.75  The rules regulating 
police investigation are largely statutory, and they describe with some specificity 
the boundaries of proper police practice.76  In cases of extreme misconduct by the 
police, Finnish courts have remedies available that could include the exclusion of 
evidence.77  More typically, though, the remedy for police misconduct would 
involve individual discipline of the police officer.  For example, in one case, 
persons arrested by a police officer for theft brought a private prosecution against 
the officer, on the ground that he had violated his official obligations by calling 
them “thieves” during the arrest.78  Although the Finnish courts found the 
dereliction petty and thus acquitted the officer, a dissenting judge in the court of 
appeals would have upheld a fine imposed on the officer “mainly because [he] had 
continued to call [them] ‘thieves’” after the arrival at the scene of the arrest of 
supporting officers, and thus after the situation had calmed down.79 
In the United States, federal court review of the constitutionality of state 
convictions serves to ensure that state courts grant due respect to the prisoner’s 
federal rights.  The existence of federal review thus manifests a concern that, in the 
absence of such review, state courts would not vindicate federal rights.  By virtue 
of ruling last on such issues, federal courts have a superior, reviewing role over the 
decisions of state courts on questions of federal law. 
In recent years, however, there has arisen in some quarters a lack of confidence 
in the regulatory performance of federal habeas courts.  A sense that federal habeas 
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 74. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  The truth of the sense of that pithy epigram is 
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English translation is on file with the author, and available by e-mail from the Finnish Ministry of 
Justice.  See http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1987/en19870449.  The current Finnish version is 
available at http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1987/19870449. 
 77. See I-SHO 2005:24 (adjudicating private criminal prosecution brought by arrested persons 
against arresting officer). 
 78. Id. (describing an effort initiated by a private person to criminally prosecute a police officer for 
the officer’s behavior during the arrest). 
 79. Id. 
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courts too often or too easily have overturned state court convictions led to the 
passage, in 1996, of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA).80  Under that act, a federal court can only grant habeas relief on a claim 
rejected by the state courts if the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”81 
One can therefore understand the standards governing federal habeas review of 
state convictions as reflecting the prevalent sense of the location of the greatest risk 
of erroneous appellate judgments.  The existence of federal habeas review reflects 
the concern that state courts will not, in the absence of federal court review, 
vindicate state prisoners’ legitimate claims of violation of federal rights.  The 
current deferential standard of review reflects the concern that federal courts, if 
entrusted with the power of de novo review of federal constitutional claims, will 
too frequently and improperly overturn state convictions on federal law grounds. 
Although not a federal republic, Finland has, by treaty, embarked on a kind of 
criminal justice federalism by joining international organizations that operate 
courts having some jurisdiction to decide cases arising out of Finnish convictions.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a creature of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).82  The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is an agency of the European Union (EU). 
The ECHR obligates member states, including Finland, to respect and protect a 
broad range of rights, such as the freedom of speech and religion.83  The 
Convention also contains guarantees relevant to criminal procedure, such as 
provisions requiring prompt notification of the charges faced by an arrested 
person,84 a speedy trial or release pending trial,85 a fair and public trial,86 the 
assistance of counsel,87 the opportunity to present evidence and to confront the 
prosecution’s evidence,88 and the presumption of innocence.89  Provisions 
contained in Protocol 7 to the Convention establish a right of appeal in criminal 
cases90 and prohibit prosecution or punishment twice for the same offense.91 
Persons who claim to have suffered a violation of such rights may apply to the 
ECtHR for redress.92  In the event that it finds a violation, the Court’s primary 
remedial power is declaratory, but member states have thus far complied with its 
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rulings.93  As a result of the right of individual application and the presence in the 
ECHR of criminal procedure provisions, in cases raising such issues, “the 
jurisprudence is beginning to resemble the habeas corpus jurisprudence in the 
United States whereby federal courts review whether state court criminal trials 
have complied with the United States Constitution.”94 
The ECJ has jurisdiction to enforce member state compliance with EU laws.95  
Until relatively recently, cooperation among EU member states regarding criminal 
matters occurred largely outside the EU framework.96  Nevertheless, and with 
greater frequency in recent years, criminal cases can raise questions of EU law, as 
when a defendant argues that the national law on the authority of which the State 
prosecutes violates EU law.97  When the possibility of conflict between national 
and EU law arises in a criminal prosecution in a member state court, that court can 
refer the legal issue to the ECJ for resolution.98  The referral must come from the 
member state court; the defendant has no right to bring the case to the ECJ and no 
right to insist on a referral to the ECJ.99  If, after a referral, the ECJ determines that 
the national law at issue violates EU law, the conviction also violates EU law and 
must be set aside.100 
The role of the ECJ in the post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions is, 
thus, narrow.  The ECJ has jurisdiction only to decide questions of EU law, and 
thus only can act in criminal cases in which a question of EU law arises.  Even in 
such cases, the ECJ can act only when a member state court refers a question 
involving EU law to it, and “[g]enerally speaking, national courts seem to be 
reluctant to refer” cases to the ECJ.101  However, if “a party takes the position that 
national law must be set aside in favor of overriding Union rules, it may force the 
national court to take a position” on the legal question.102 
In some respects, the ECtHR and the ECJ play a role in the architecture of 
Finnish post-trial judicial review similar to the role played by federal habeas courts 
in the United States.103  The international treaties establish a body of law with 
which Finnish courts must comply, just as the United States Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 93. McKaskle, supra note 82, at 31.  Finland regards decisions of the ECHR as binding.  See KKO 
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establishes a body of law with which American state courts must comply.  The 
ECtHR and the ECJ can apply that externally-defined body of law to Finnish 
criminal cases, just as federal habeas courts can apply the United States 
Constitution in state prosecutions.  In both Finland and the United States, the 
international or federal court applies an “exhaustion” requirement, obliging 
prisoners to present their claims first in the Finnish or state court before seeking 
redress in the international or federal court.104  Even the content of the law enforced 
by the ECtHR, in declaring general principles of fair procedure, shares much in 
common with the criminal procedure amendments to the United States Constitution 
enforced by federal habeas courts. 
In some procedural respects as well, the ECtHR and the ECJ function like 
federal habeas courts.  The ECtHR principle of “subsidiarity” illustrates such a 
similarity.  That principle holds that “the primary enforcers of human rights within 
each member state are the courts of that state.”105  The principle implies “that each 
member state must be granted some flexibility in applying the principles 
enunciated in the Convention.”106 
The AEDPA’s deferential standard of review has much the same effect of 
allowing flexibility and permitting different states to interpret constitutional rights 
differently.  Only when the Supreme Court clearly states that some application 
violates the Constitution will federal habeas courts declare state courts to have 
violated the Constitution in following the disapproved interpretation.  Similarly, the 
subsidiarity principle does not extend so far as to allow a state to “act in variance to 
a clearly expressed standard contained in the Convention or in the decisions of the 
Court that interpret the Convention.”107 
Another similarity involves the reliance of the international and federal courts 
on Finnish and state court fact-finding, respectively.  In the United States, federal 
habeas courts have the capacity to take new evidence relevant to the federal law 
claims, but relatively rarely do so.108  The ECtHR has rules that enable it to engage 
in fact-finding, but its practical capacity for independent inquiry into the underlying 
facts is limited.109 
In other respects, important differences distinguish ECtHR and ECJ review 
from federal habeas review.  The American federal habeas system places federal 
courts in every state, and circuit courts of appeal provide intermediate appellate 
review for geographically-defined groups of states.  That structure of federal courts 
beneath the United States Supreme Court allows the federal habeas system to 
accommodate large numbers of cases from individual states, and thus give an 
interpretation of federal law that bears directly on local practice and conditions. 
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By contrast, the ECtHR and the ECJ are single courts, without a structure of 
lower international courts beneath them.  As a consequence of that fact and of the 
obligation, in the case of the ECtHR, to accept for review all cases that present a 
credible claim,110 the ECtHR especially has large caseloads and long processing 
delays.111  The caseload management problem is aggravated by the fact that the 
ECtHR serves a community of nations that has an aggregate population three times 
larger than the population of the United States.112 
As a result, ECtHR review may not influence practice in any one individual 
country as much as federal habeas review influences practice in the United States.  
Two considerations account for this.  First, because of the size and number of other 
countries it serves, the ECtHR has decided relatively few Finnish cases raising 
criminal procedure issues.  Finland ratified the ECHR in 1990, and the first case 
challenging an action of the Finnish government was decided by the ECtHR in 
1994.113  In the twenty years since ratification, the ECtHR has entered judgments in 
151 Finnish cases, and rejected 2874 applications as “inadmissible,” a category 
which includes applications that fail to state a claim of violation, that are untimely, 
or that do not demonstrate the exhaustion of domestic remedies.114  In 119 of those 
151 cases, the ECtHR found Finland in violation of the Convention.115  Just 
twenty-six percent of those findings of violation involved claims of violation of 
Article 6 right to a fair trial provisions.116  A further forty percent involved 
violations of the Article 6 provisions relating to the length of trial proceedings.117  
Not all such cases necessarily involve criminal trials.  In 2010, the ECtHR made 
judgments in 17 cases originating in Finland, finding violations in 16 such cases.118  
Two cases involved fair trial rights, and eight involved length of proceeding 
claims.119  Because of the relatively small number of cases the ECtHR can take 
from Finland, the ECtHR lacks the ability to assess and regulate Finnish criminal 
procedure as comprehensively as federal habeas courts can assess and regulate a 
state’s criminal procedure. 
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Second, because of the greater legal and cultural diversity of the countries 
within its jurisdiction, ECtHR decisions about practices in other countries may 
have little to offer, in terms of guidance, to Finnish lawyers and judges.  As 
McKaskle notes, “the participating countries do not share a common source of law 
and have major cultural differences.  A substantial number are, at best, emerging 
democracies.”120  Though there is some legal and cultural diversity amongst 
American states, its extent pales in comparison to Europe’s.  Consequently, federal 
habeas court decisions from other states and circuits with similar judicial practices 
can illuminate the meaning, and thus encourage the avoidance of violations, of 
federal law by a state court. 
Another notable distinction between federal habeas and ECtHR jurisprudence 
is the frequency with which the ECtHR finds violations in the cases that present an 
admissible claim.  Even before the advent of the AEDPA standard of review, the 
prisoner did not usually prevail.  After the AEDPA, federal habeas relief is much 
harder to win.  However, if the preliminary finding of inadmissibility reflects a 
judgment on the merits of a claim, the proportion of findings of violation to 
findings of non-violation by the ECtHR may resemble more nearly the proportion 
in federal habeas courts. 
The legal and cultural diversity of Europe also fosters controversy or 
ambiguity about matters more clearly settled in federal habeas practice.  For 
example, in the ECtHR context, “there are legitimate issues as to exactly what the 
nature of the review of member state decisions should be.”121  Moreover, there is 
controversy over the extent to which different cultures and conditions in different 
member states should permit the ECtHR to find that a practice that would violate 
the Convention in one state does not violate the Convention in another.122  Taken 
together, these considerations make federal habeas a more effective and influential 
system of oversight than the ECtHR can be. 
The comparison of Finnish and American federalism supports one final 
conclusion.  Whereas practical considerations contrived to give Finland greater 
freedom of action than the United States in the choice of whether to have appellate 
courts receive evidence, practical considerations in regards to federalism permit in 
the United States the operation of a more effective federal review than Finland can 
achieve, at least so long as the only Finnish federalism is international. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
Both Finland and the United States are relatively young countries, each 
governed before independence by culturally-influential empires.  Prior to its 
independence in 1917, Finland was for centuries a part of Sweden, and then for a 
little more than a hundred years the Russian Tsar’s Grand Duchy.  The United 
States, of course, was part of the British Empire.  As a consequence, both countries 
received a legal tradition that originated elsewhere, and in both countries, that 
tradition remains influential.  In this Part, the article describes the origins and 
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development of each country’s system of post-trial judicial review of criminal 
convictions. 
A.  The Origins and Development of Finnish Post-Trial Judicial Review 
Although part of the Russian Empire between 1809 and 1917, Finland 
occupied a special position within that empire, and Russian judicial institutions 
were not imposed to any great extent on Finland.123  Only within the last twenty 
years of Russian rule was any determined effort at Russification undertaken, and it 
had not progressed very far when interrupted by the Russian Revolution, the fall of 
the Tsar, and Finnish independence.124  After independence, a short but bitter civil 
war between Red and White factions in Finland led to the defeat of the Reds and a 
repudiation of Russian influences on Finnish civic life.125  With respect to the legal 
system, those circumstances left the legal traditions derived from the older Swedish 
influence, which had persisted through the period of Russian rule, predominant.126 
A detailed examination of the Swedish legal system falls outside the scope of 
this article.127  It is sufficient for present purposes to note that Sweden’s legal 
system belongs within the continental civil law tradition.128  As Marshall has 
shown, antecedents of the right to appeal a criminal conviction in that tradition 
appear in Roman law.129  After a period of legal decentralization in the feudal 
middle ages, the right to appeal a criminal conviction was reborn in the continental 
tradition in the effort of monarchies to re-capture previously dispersed powers.130 
One mechanism for centralizing power was the assertion of appellate 
jurisdiction over local courts.131  Appellate courts could more effectively exert 
control if not bound by any principle of deference to the decisions of lower courts.  
Hence, the ecclesiastical court tradition of full de novo review proved attractive to 
the centralizers and became typical in the continental civil law system.132  Thus did 
a system of appellate de novo review of all questions of law and fact take root in 
the continental system. 
A Swedish law code was promulgated in 1734.133  That code, though 
comprehensively amended since, remains the basis of Swedish law.134  More 
significantly for present purposes, the 1734 code also forms the basis, though of 
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course also comprehensively amended, of the code of judicial procedure still in 
force in Finland.135 
Several features of it bear mention.  As in Sweden,136 appeals in Finnish 
criminal cases amount to a trial de novo of such issues of law and fact as an 
appellant wishes to raise.137  As in Sweden,138 Finnish law provides for the 
participation of lay judges in the trial courts.139 
Finland uses different arrangements of fact-finders at trial.140  In some cases, a 
single legally-trained or “professional” judge can return a verdict.141  In other cases, 
a panel of three professional judges decides the case.142  In cases involving more 
serious charges, a professional judge and three or four lay judges decide the case. 
Lay judges are selected by municipal councils to serve four-year terms.143  
During their terms, lay judges do not work full time in their judicial capacities, but 
rather sit on trials on a regular, but part-time, basis.  In cases in which lay judges 
participate with a professional judge, the verdict is decided by majority vote of all 
judges, but professional judges have the prerogative to speak first in the 
deliberations.144  In returning a verdict, the court prepares a written opinion, 
explaining the reasoning behind the verdict.145  Lay judges do not participate in 
deciding cases in the appellate court, that task being left exclusively to professional 
judges.146 
The fact that lay judges participate in the trial courts but not in the de novo 
appeals confirms that the structure of the appellate system puts the lay judges in a 
relatively marginal position.  Not only do they deliberate in common with the 
professional judges in the trial court, but also the verdicts they reach can be 
overturned on de novo review by a panel composed exclusively of professional 
judges.  While the Finnish system grants a place to lay participation in criminal 
cases, thereby recognizing some value in a non-professional perspective, that 
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perspective is, ultimately and by means of the system of appellate review, 
subordinated to the perspective of professional judges.147 
Probably the most significant recent development in Finnish post-trial judicial 
review involves the accession in the 1990’s by Finland to the treaties that establish 
the ECtHR and the ECJ.  The implications of those courts for Finnish post-trial 
judicial review have already been described. 
B.  The Origins and Development of American Post-Trial Judicial Review 
As noted above, the American system of post-trial judicial review divides, for 
state prisoners, into three phases: direct appeal, state post-conviction, and federal 
habeas.  To some extent, each phase developed independently of the others.  This 
article therefore addresses each in turn. 
1.  Direct Appeal 
At common law, post-trial judicial review of a conviction was available to 
some extent in the trial court, via a motion for a new trial.148  Such a motion 
became available in England by the late 17th century.149  At least two significant 
limitations applied to such motions.  First, because they were filed in the trial court, 
they did not bring to bear the fresh perspective on the case associated with review 
by other judges in an appellate court.  Second, the law specified that evidence 
presented through a motion for a new trial be newly discovered.150  Given the 
further restriction that the motion be filed during the same term of court in which 
the trial was held,151 such motions afforded an opportunity only to prisoners who, 
very soon after trial, discovered new information bearing on the issue of guilt.  In 
effect, thus, the common law motion for a new trial amounted to the recognition of 
a brief waiting-period after the verdict designed to allow for the consideration only 
of slightly delayed information. 
At common law, post-trial review of a conviction outside the trial court was, if 
anything, even more limited.  The “criminal appeal, in the common law world, is of 
recent origin.”152  England’s system of common law courts, unlike the civil law 
courts found on the continent in the Middle Ages, did not confront at that time a 
similarly powerful centralizing force.  As a consequence, in England, such 
possibilities of post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions as then existed 
were infrequently invoked and did not develop into vehicles for the comprehensive 
reconsideration of the trial or the verdict.  Similarly, in America and in other 
common law countries before the mid- to late-nineteenth century, convicted 
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defendants had few options for post-trial review, and those they did have tended to 
be “disappointingly impotent.”153 
For example, an early method of reviewing verdicts, attaint, involved a review 
of the first jury’s verdict by a second jury composed of twice as many persons.154  
If the second jury found the first verdict erroneous, “the verdict was reversed, the 
[original] jurors lost their chattels, were jailed for at least a year, and were 
accounted infamous.”155  Moreover, to the extent that attaint was available at all in 
criminal cases, it was not available to review guilty verdicts, and thus was a remedy 
available to the prosecution but not to the defense.156 
The common law device for the appellate review of criminal convictions most 
influential in America was the writ of error.157  By it, a higher court could require a 
lower court, after judgment in the lower court, to “send up the record . . . for review 
of errors apparent on it.”158  The “record” as known to the common law did not 
include any report of the evidence at trial, but rather consisted of “the judge’s 
commission, the indictment, the plea of the defendant, the verdict, together with 
entries kept in the minute book, such as the names of the jurors, an abstract of the 
indictment, a memorandum of the pleas, verdict, and sentence.”159  The writ of 
error proved “an unsatisfactory appellate remedy” because the “appellate court 
could review only errors apparent on the record, which on the one hand contained a 
mass of useless items and on the other hand took no notice of the rulings on the 
evidence, nor the instructions by the court to the jury, not to mention errors of fact 
such as the innocence of the defendant.”160 
Succeeding the writ of error in some states was the “bill of exceptions.”161  The 
bill of exceptions afforded a means by which a disappointed litigant could 
challenge rulings on motions and objections.162  Various procedural and practical 
obstacles, though, delayed the development of the bill of exceptions as a robust 
vehicle for the review of the fairness of trial.  First, not until well into the 
nineteenth century were bills of exceptions understood to be available in criminal 
cases.163  Moreover, even after the expansion of the bill to criminal cases, its filing 
did not necessarily imply a stay of the judgment.  Thus, for example, in a mid-
nineteenth century Missouri criminal case, the courts allowed the filing of a bill of 
exceptions but did not stay the defendant’s execution, and he was therefore hung 
before any appellate examination of the case could take place.164  Beyond those 
procedural obstacles, the practical and technological limitations of nineteenth 
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century practice inhibited the development of appellate review of criminal 
convictions.  As Professor Bowman notes, “the importance of the advent of 
shorthand reporters in 1887—and of their absence before—can hardly be 
exaggerated.”165 
Without a tradition of appellate examination of criminal convictions, no 
substantial body of case law existed, leaving lawyers and trial courts without the 
materials on which to base and decide appellate arguments challenging the fairness 
of trial procedures.166  As a result, to mid-nineteenth century lawyers, “the idea of a 
fair trial implied one good, thorough airing of the facts before a local judge and 
jury, with ample opportunity for the lawyers to exercise their rhetorical gifts.”167  In 
that world, the need for a criminal appeal scarcely existed.  Thus, in the United 
States, “the proposition that those convicted of crimes should have the right to 
challenge their convictions only took root around the turn of the twentieth 
century.”168  In the federal system, the Judiciary Act of 1889169 “first established 
the right to appeal a conviction in federal court,” though limited initially to capital 
cases.170 
In England, around the same time, some notorious miscarriages of justice led 
to the establishment of a right to a more thorough criminal appeal.171  The appalling 
case of Adolf Beck would, one must hope, embarrass any legal system into reform.  
Beck was arrested in London in 1895 and subsequently convicted for thefts 
perpetrated against a series of vulnerable women to whom the perpetrator presented 
himself as a nobleman, prospective employer, and lover.172  The evidence against 
Beck consisted of the eyewitness identification testimony of the victims.  At the 
time of Beck’s prosecution, his lawyer recalled that frauds substantially identical in 
every detail had been committed in London in 1877, presumably by the same man.  
In 1877, a man who had given his name as John Smith had been convicted and 
served time for those crimes.  Beck, a 54-year old Norwegian former sailor, offered 
to prove that he had lived in Peru in 1877; therefore, he could not have committed 
the prior crimes and thus had not committed the charged crimes.  The prosecution 
found a police officer involved in the 1877 case who would testify that Smith and 
Beck were the same man.  In fact, as was later discovered, a man named Thomas 
Smith committed both the 1877 and 1895 crimes.  The trial court excluded all 
evidence about the prior crimes, thus rendering irrelevant Beck’s proof of his 
former Peruvian residence.  Beck’s attempt to appeal on that ground failed because 
the trial court refused to certify the case for appeal. 
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Beck served five years.  In the second year of his imprisonment, a prison 
official examined old 1877 prison records relating to Smith and found a reference 
to the fact that Smith had claimed to be Jewish and was found to be circumcised.  
Prison officials then examined Beck, discovered that he and Smith could not be the 
same man, and made a report to that effect to Beck’s trial judge.  Nevertheless, the 
judge declined to re-open the case, and nobody informed Beck of the discovery nor 
took any further action.  Beck served his sentence and was released in 1901.  Three 
years later, Smith’s commission of several identical frauds brought to the mind of 
the investigating officer the 1895 cases.  In due course, the police arrested Beck 
and the 1904 victims identified him as the perpetrator.  Beck’s plea to the jury at 
trial—”Before God, my maker, I am absolutely innocent of every charge brought 
against me.  I have not spoken to or seen any of these women before they were set 
against me by the detectives”—proved unavailing in the face of the eyewitness 
identification testimony, and he was again convicted.  Only with Smith’s 
subsequent capture in the course of the commission of an identical fraud, and his 
confession to all of the crimes, did Beck’s ordeal end.  The notoriety of such 
events, in combination with technological and legal advances, ultimately produced 
in the common law countries our current, more expansive version of criminal 
appeal.173 
For present purposes, the crucial point is that a substantial form of appellate 
review in the United States emerged only after the establishment of the fact-finding 
primacy of the jury.  When appellate review developed, it developed in the light of 
that established principle and has offered as yet no ultimately successful challenge 
to it.  History, therefore, may account as much as any logic for our characteristic 
appellate deference to jury fact-finding.  
2.  Federal Habeas Corpus 
In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars debated the content of the 
post-independence and nineteenth century habeas protection.174  On one account, 
habeas corpus initially authorized federal courts, in a post-conviction context, to 
inquire only into the fact of the conviction and the subject matter and territorial 
jurisdiction of the convicting court.  Habeas did not traditionally permit any inquiry 
into the conviction’s substantive justice or the lawfulness of the legal processes that 
produced it.175  In the 1870’s, the writ expanded to encompass an inquiry into 
whether a prisoner had been convicted or sentenced under an unconstitutional 
statute; claims challenging the procedures by which the conviction was obtained 
remained outside the scope of the writ.176  Further expansion followed early in the 
twentieth century to allow federal habeas courts to inquire into whether prior state 
court proceedings had allowed full and fair presentation of claims.  Finally, in a 
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series of cases in the middle of the twentieth century, the writ expanded to permit 
federal court review of claims of any constitutional violation. 
The second account is associated with Justice Brennan’s opinion in Fay v. 
Noia.177  On that account, the scope of the habeas inquiry did not enlarge over time; 
rather, the legal protections granted to defendants evolved.  On that view, habeas 
corpus was always a “forum for providing specified classes of prisoners with 
review of the legality of their detention under existing standards of due process.”178  
The evolution affected only the content of the existing standards of due process. 
After noting flaws in both accounts, Hertz and Liebman conclude that federal 
habeas amounted to a limited appellate procedure, in that “it has lain only to claims 
of particular national importance.”179  It also constituted a “substitute” procedure, 
in the sense that “habeas corpus has never duplicated, but has always mirrored the 
scope of, Supreme Court review on direct appeal.”180 
This article takes no position as between those accounts of the development of 
federal habeas corpus in America.  For present purposes, it is sufficient just to note 
that “[a]lthough the line between legal and factual questions has changed over time, 
the scope of both modes of review has always been de novo on legal claims and 
deferential-to-nonexistent on factual findings.”181  Moreover, “innocence claims 
and their close cousins, claims that the penal statute was not intended to reach a 
particular prisoner’s conduct, are both nationally unimportant because sui generis, 
and subject to no or little review because aimed at the central fact determination at 
trial.”182  Thus, federal habeas corpus has never provided a forum for de novo 
reconsideration of a prisoner’s guilt. 
3.  State Post-Conviction Review 
As early as the colonial period, habeas corpus was known to courts in 
America.183  Upon independence, a number of states recognized the writ in their 
constitutions or by statute.184  In the first decades after independence, the writ as 
applied in state courts afforded a relatively narrow basis for reviewing 
convictions.185  Only in the mid-twentieth century did the movement toward 
modernizing and expanding state post-conviction review emerge.186 
The emergence of state post-conviction review responded to the mid-twentieth 
century development of a more robust federal habeas review.  A federal habeas 
doctrine developed that required federal habeas courts to respect prior state court 
decisions denying relief on federal law claims, out of respect for state authority.  
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The classic example of such a federal habeas doctrine is the “adequate and 
independent state law grounds” principle.187  By that principle, if the state court 
rejected a prisoner’s federal constitutional claim on the basis that the prisoner had, 
in presenting the federal claim in state court, violated a state law procedural rule, 
the federal habeas court was bound also to reject the federal claim, out of respect 
for the state law procedural rule, at least if that rule met certain conditions.188 
For example, if the state court enforced a rule of procedure that required a 
defendant to make a federal claim at a certain time in the case, and the prisoner 
raised the claim later in violation of that rule, the enforcement of the state law 
timing rule would justify the state court in denying the federal claim, regardless of 
the federal claim’s intrinsic merits.  In order to take advantage of the opportunity 
that federal habeas doctrine presented, the state courts needed to have such 
“adequate and independent” procedural rules.  In order to have those rules, the state 
needed to offer some judicial forum in which the federal claim could be raised.  
Because some claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, cannot coherently 
be raised at trial, states therefore needed to have systems of post-trial judicial 
review available for the litigation of such claims. 
No reason exists to think that the direct appeal – state post-conviction review – 
federal habeas system has reached its final form.  Dissatisfaction persists with the 
system.  Some scholars have proposed a radical re-structuring that would change 
and limit state post-conviction review and federal habeas in favor of an increased 
emphasis on direct appeal.189 
For example, evidently frustrated with its system, in 1989, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court abolished the court rule that provided a comprehensive scheme of 
post-conviction review in that state’s courts.190  The abolition left available to 
Arkansas state prisoners only the “narrower” post-conviction remedy defined by 
Arkansas’s version of habeas corpus, in which a court could hear only claims that 
the “commitment is valid on its face or whether the convicting court had proper 
jurisdiction.”191  However, soon afterwards, perhaps having realized that the 
narrowing of state post-conviction review could permit federal courts a freer hand 
in reviewing federal habeas petitions from Arkansas state prisoners, Arkansas re-
established a broader state post-conviction review.192  
C.  Conclusion 
In the civil law tradition, the possibility of broad post-trial review of a criminal 
conviction developed much earlier as a part of the process of centralizing 
governmental functions and power.  In that context, a strong principle of deference 
to the trial court did not emerge.  Centralization through appellate review requires 
the capacity to communicate information about the case from the local court to the 
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central authority.  Before the advent of professional shorthand court reporting, 
appellate review thus required a predominantly written trial process: 
Writing was . . . the key to this change and it is ironic that almost the first 
and certainly the most potent use of wider literacy was this capture of 
criminal justice by the crown and the greater magnates.  The major 
technique adopted by royal judges and prosecutors in France for bringing 
the seigneurial courts within the jurisdiction of the crown was the 
revolutionary concept of appellate review, which was facilitated by 
literacy.193 
In the common law tradition, the right to appeal a criminal conviction 
developed relatively recently, and in response more to a concern to avoid 
miscarriages of justice than as an instrument of the centralization of government 
power.  For centuries, English trials remained primarily oral events, and thus 
resisted appellate review beyond the formalities subject to examination via the writ 
of error.194  As a result, appeals as to matters of substance developed after the 
emergence and establishment of the idea that jury verdicts in criminal cases are 
entitled to deference and finality. 
III.  THE MATERIAL OF POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
Having examined the architecture and origins of post-trial judicial review, the 
article next considers the material of that review.  What sort of inquiry do 
reviewing courts undertake when called upon to examine the legality of a criminal 
conviction?  The article divides its description into two parts.  The first focuses on 
the kinds of claims a prisoner can bring against the validity of a conviction.  The 
second part focuses on waiver arguments by which the prosecution can justify a 
reviewing court in upholding the conviction, regardless of the merits of a prisoner’s 
challenge to the validity of a conviction. 
A.  Claims of Error 
Finland and the United States differ with regard to the content or focus of post-
trial judicial review.  In the United States, post-trial judicial review tends to avoid 
or constrain any direct inquiry into the justice of the jury’s verdict.  Instead, 
reviewing courts examine the rulings by which the court structured the trial.  
However, as shown below, an inclination to find means to inquire into the factual 
justice of the conviction persists in the United States and has given rise to a number 
of procedural claims that come close to, without quite being, a direct inquiry into 
the factual justice of the conviction. 
In Finland, post-trial judicial review tends not to focus on procedural or 
structural complaints about the trial.  Instead, appeals typically challenge the 
outcome of the trial—the factual accuracy of the verdict.  Various considerations 
account for the factual, rather than procedural, focus of the Finnish criminal appeal.  
These include the relatively less procedurally dense nature of the Finnish trial and 
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the opportunity to rectify any procedural errors in the process of re-trying the case 
on appeal. 
The article explores these contrasts further in three categories.  The first 
encompasses challenges to trial court procedural or trial management rulings.  The 
second includes challenges to the factual accuracy or substantive justice of the 
verdict convicting the defendant.  The third contains a kind of composite of the first 
two: nominally procedural or trial management claims that engage the reviewing 
court relatively directly in an examination of the factual justice of the conviction. 
1.  Claims of Procedural Error 
In the American system, in each of the three phases of post-trial judicial 
review (direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas), the 
prisoner’s challenge to the conviction most often alleges procedural or structural 
errors in the trial, rather than an erroneous verdict.195  Appellants commonly raise 
arguments about, for example, such matters as the adequacy of the charging 
document, the State’s compliance with its pre-trial disclosure obligations, the 
content of jury instructions, or such structural considerations as the timing or 
location of trial and the adequacy of jury selection as a test of the qualifications of 
the jurors.  Significantly, with the exceptions discussed below, post-trial judicial 
review of a conviction does not directly involve a claim that the prisoner is 
innocent of the charge.196 
That being the case, the question of the prisoner’s guilt or innocence can be 
irrelevant to the success of the argument advanced on appeal.  A defendant 
erroneously denied a change of venue, for example, will succeed in an appeal 
challenging a conviction regardless of the strength of the evidence of guilt.  
Because the flaw identified by such a successful appeal affects only the trial 
process, rather than the trial outcome, the consequence of a successful appeal is not 
acquittal, but rather the cancellation of the conviction on the understanding that the 
prosecution can usually try to win conviction again after a second trial. 
In some instances, the strength of the evidence of guilt can bear on the success 
of such challenges to trial court procedural rulings.  By operation of the harmless 
error rule, the absence of any doubt about the prisoner’s guilt may defeat an appeal 
that otherwise identifies a genuine procedural flaw in the trial.197  That rule, though, 
only applies in one direction.  The Supreme Court has not recognized the presence 
of doubt about guilt as justifying relief in the absence of procedural error,198 
although the Court has held that a strong showing of innocence may excuse a 
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prisoner’s default of a claim alleging a procedural error.199  Except in the 
circumstances described below in which doubt itself forms the basis for the 
challenge to the conviction, the presence of doubt does not make what would 
otherwise be a correct procedural ruling into an erroneous one justifying 
reversal.200 
American courts recognize an exception to the availability to the prosecution 
of the harmless error argument.  In cases involving a procedural error that is 
“structural” in nature, the error requires reversal without regard to the strength of 
the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.201  Some controversy can attend the question 
of whether a particular error is “structural,” and thus immune from harmless error, 
or is rather a “trial error” subject to a harmless error analysis. 
In Finland, procedural complaints about the trial cannot form the basis for an 
appeal unless a law specifically permits the procedural ground in question to be 
appealed.202  Beyond that rule barring the appeal of certain procedural rulings, at 
least two considerations account for the relative rarity of Finnish procedural 
appeals.  First, many of the procedural complaints that form the bases of American 
criminal appeals simply do not arise in the Finnish courts.  For example, to a large 
extent, with regard to the regulation of the information available for consideration 
by the fact-finders at trial, Finland adheres to the principle of free evaluation of 
evidence.203  By that rule, the fact-finder is charged with applying an appropriate 
discount to the value of information introduced in a flawed form, such as hearsay.  
Trials, therefore, tend to involve disputes about the value and implications of 
evidence, rather than about the admissibility of evidence.  In the absence of trial 
rulings about the admissibility of evidence, one cannot base a challenge to a 
conviction on such a ruling.  Thus, Finnish appeals tend to focus on a challenge to 
the trial court’s judgment about the value and implications of evidence, as 
expressed in the written order explaining the verdict.204 
Also, Finland regulates police investigatory conduct largely by means of 
training and discipline.  Only rarely is evidence excluded from a trial on the ground 
that the police violated a law in discovering it.205  As a consequence, Finnish trials 
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and pre-trial proceedings typically do not involve litigation about the means by 
which evidence has been discovered.  Thus, Finnish appeals likewise rarely focus 
on the means by which the police have discovered evidence. 
A second reason for the relative absence of procedural complaints as the bases 
for challenges to Finnish convictions lies in the fact that, in Finland, post-trial 
judicial review affords an opportunity to redo whatever part of the trial seemed to a 
litigant to have been incorrectly handled.206  That being the case, a defendant 
dissatisfied with the trial court’s treatment of some procedural issue can, on appeal, 
seek in the appellate court a reconsideration of that treatment in the context of a 
broader reconsideration of the case.207 
Finnish post-trial judicial review sometimes does involve an examination of 
trial procedures.  Some kinds of procedural or structural errors affecting the trial 
must be appealable because their nature makes the error not subject to correction in 
a de novo appeal.  Classic examples of such errors would include the right to a 
speedy trial,208 the right not to be tried twice for the same offense,209 the denial of 
an impartial judge,210 and an error in extraditing a defendant.211 
In some cases, Finnish post-trial reviewing courts hear claims of procedural 
error of a sort that could be corrected in a de novo appeal.212  Such claims can arise 
in the context of a review of the factual justice of the conviction.  For example, in 
KKO 1995:66, the Finish Supreme Court heard the appeal in a case of a father who 
allegedly, while a passenger in a car driven by his son, grabbed the steering wheel 
causing an accident.  At the father’s trial, relying on a testimonial privilege 
available to close family members of an accused defendant, the son did not testify.  
The prosecution introduced a statement the son had made during the pre-trial 
investigation.  Because that statement formed the basis for the conviction, the 
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether its use violated the testimonial 
privilege.  Finding that it did, the Supreme Court held that the statement could not 
be used, and thus acquitted the defendant.213 
Moreover, Finland recognizes certain kinds of procedural errors as sufficiently 
significant that they can be raised even in the extraordinary review phase.214  Thus, 
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appeals have addressed claims of procedural error where the procedure in question 
implicates a human rights principle identified in the ECHR.215  For example, citing 
an ECHR provision, a Finnish appellate court held that a trial court erred in 
denying the defendant’s right to examine a co-perpetrator whose statement was 
used in support of the defendant’s conviction.216  Finally, the possibility of post-
trial judicial review of procedural rulings exists in Finland, as it must, as a means 
for deciding, on a consistent basis, important disputes about the interpretation of 
those rules.217 
2.  Claims of Factual Injustice in Conviction 
Challenges to Finnish convictions tend to focus on questions relating to guilt 
or innocence.  In some cases, such appeals contest, in whole or in part, the trial 
court’s resolution of the factual truth of the charge.218  In other cases, such appeals 
raise a legal question about whether the criminal law prohibits the conduct proven 
to have been committed.219 
When such an appeal involves a dispute about the facts of the case, if a Finnish 
appellant believes that the trial court improperly under- or over-valued certain 
evidence, the appellant can present that evidence again in the appellate court.220  
The prisoner may also present in the appeals court evidence not presented at trial, 
without regard to whether the evidence could have been presented at the trial.221  If 
a Finnish prisoner discovers new evidence after the direct appeal bearing on the 
justice of the conviction, the prisoner may initiate the extraordinary review process 
in the intermediate court of appeals and present the evidence there.222  No deadline 
focused on the passage of time exists since the trial limits that right.223  In deciding 
whether new evidence presented after the conclusion of the ordinary appeal 
justifies vacating the conviction, the Finnish appellate court determines whether the 
new evidence “would probably have led to the acquittal of the defendant or to the 
application of less severe penal provisions to the offence, or there are compelling 
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reasons . . . to reconsider the question of whether or not the defendant had 
committed the offence for which he or she has been convicted.”224 
No discussion of the differences between Finnish and American post-trial 
judicial review of a conviction would be complete without noting that Finland, 
unlike the United States,225 affords the prosecution the opportunity to seek post-
trial judicial review of acquittals.226  In some respects, the prosecution’s right to 
seek review is narrower than the defendant’s.  For example, the prosecution 
confronts deadlines not applicable to defendants when the prosecution seeks to 
invoke the extraordinary review powers of Finnish courts to the detriment of the 
defendant.227 
In the American system, an appeal raising a legal question about whether the 
criminal law prohibits the proven conduct can of course be raised, and because 
such an appeal poses a legal question, the reviewing court will decide the case 
without deference to the lower court’s judgment on the question of law.228  To that 
extent, no significant distinction between the American and Finnish systems of 
post-trial judicial review exists.  A distinction does exist, however, between the 
systems in regards to their treatment of claims challenging the factual basis of a 
conviction. 
In the American system, in only two circumstances does a claim of innocence 
become the direct focus of inquiry in post-trial judicial review.  The first occurs 
when a court confronts a claim that the prosecution, at trial, introduced insufficient 
evidence to support the conviction.229  Because the court in the context of 
sufficiency claims considers only the evidence presented at trial, that post-trial 
review operates on a record that is closed at the end of the trial.  The second occurs 
when a court receives new evidence bearing on the issue of the prisoner’s guilt, 
typically either at a motion for a new trial or at a post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing.  Both types of claims operate under constraints that make them less than a 
de novo reconsideration of the question of the prisoner’s guilt. 
American courts distinguish between two types of closed-record appellate 
claims of innocence.230  A claim that the prosecution introduced insufficient 
evidence refers to the “legal standard which is applied to determine whether the 
case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 
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jury’s verdict as a matter of law.”231  The prosecution’s proof may be legally 
insufficient either if there is no evidence at all tending to prove an essential 
element, or if the evidence that is presented on some essential element is such “that 
it cannot be said reasonably that that the intended inference” of guilt “may logically 
be drawn” from that evidence.232 
This form of closed-record review involves not only the constraint that it may 
take no account of evidence not presented at trial, but also that the reviewing court 
must, in reviewing the prisoner’s claim of insufficient evidence, “uphold the jury’s 
verdict unless no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
considering all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the State.”233  In other words, to prevail on a claim of insufficient 
evidence, a defendant must show that the verdict was irrational.  And in 
considering that question, the court must resolve any conflict in the evidence in 
favor of the prosecution. 
A prisoner can also present a second kind of closed-record review challenge to 
a conviction, in addition to the sufficiency challenge.  Thus, “[a]lthough a verdict 
may be supported by sufficient evidence, a trial court may nevertheless conclude 
that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.”234  Such a claim focuses 
on the persuasiveness of the evidence, rather than on its capacity to support a 
logical inference of guilt.  Thus, whereas an inquiry into sufficiency investigates 
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production at trial, an inquiry into the 
weight of the evidence investigates whether the prosecution has met its burden of 
persuasion.235 
But such “weight” claims also operate under significant constraints in the 
American system.  A jury verdict must be unreasonable before the trial court can 
set it aside on the basis of the weight of the evidence.236  Moreover, a prisoner who 
pursues a “weight” claim in an appellate court after losing it in the trial court does 
not receive the de novo review applicable to claims of legal error.  Rather, the 
appellate court will defer to the trial court’s judgment denying the motion “unless it 
was made without evidence or constituted an unsustainable exercise of 
discretion.”237  However, if the prisoner prevails in the trial court on a “weight” 
claim and the prosecution appeals, the appellate court exercises a searching review.  
“This more stringent standard of review is to ensure that proper deference is given 
to a jury’s factual determinations.”238 
Such closed-record claims can also be pursued in federal habeas on the theory 
that a conviction unsupported by sufficient proof violates the United States 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process of law.239  The decision in Jackson v. 
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Virginia created some controversy as to the nature of the review of the evidence the 
Federal Constitution requires of appellate courts.240  In the end, most courts and 
commentators have concluded that the requisite review is “highly deferential.”241  
A measure of the significance of that deference appears in the consensus view that 
“appellate courts almost never reverse convictions on sufficiency grounds.”242  
Regrettably, the record of success on such claims, even when brought by 
defendants subsequently proven to be innocent, is poor.243 
While the Supreme Court has, to the extent described above, recognized that 
the Constitution is violated when a court convicts a defendant on insufficient 
evidence, the Court has yet to recognize a claim that the Constitution is violated 
when a court convicts an innocent defendant.  In that distinction, one sees revealed 
the tendency of American post-trial judicial review to examine the trial, rather than 
the underlying event.  The Court has come the closest to recognizing the 
constitutional status of a claim of innocence in capital cases posing the question 
whether it would violate the Constitution to execute an innocent person.244  Even 
that claim has only tenuous status, having been described by the Court as 
“hypothetical.”245  No prisoner who has brought such a claim has ever succeeded, 
even including some defendants subsequently shown by DNA evidence to be 
innocent.246  In Troy Davis’s case, however, the Court behaved as if such a claim 
exists in remanding for an evidentiary hearing on Davis’s claim of innocence.247 
Although a claim of innocence brought on the basis of new evidence does not 
necessarily have constitutional status, most, if not all, states empower their courts 
by rule or statute to hear such claims.  The usual vehicle for such open-record 
claims is the motion for a new trial.  Such motions have traditionally operated 
under significant limitations.248 
Many jurisdictions require that the evidence be newly discovered after trial, 
and not reasonably available or discoverable at the time of trial.249  Many 
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jurisdictions enforce a time limit that prevents a prisoner from presenting even 
newly discovered evidence if too much time has passed since trial.250  The length of 
those limitations varies, ranging “from a mere twenty-one days to three years.”251  
Also, while some jurisdictions grant judges some discretion with respect to the 
standard by which to evaluate a claim of innocence, others impose a high burden of 
persuasion on the defendant.252  Moreover, motions for a new trial are typically 
filed in the trial court, and when later reviewed by an appellate court, that court’s 
appellate review of the significance of the new evidence is constrained by 
deference owed to the trial court’s judgment.253  Finally, many jurisdictions regard 
a motion for a new trial as part of the post-conviction review process, rather than as 
part of direct appeal, and thus offer the opportunity to the prisoner several years 
after the trial, and after the constitutional right to the appointment of counsel has 
expired.254  For all these reasons, the open-record review implicit in a motion for a 
new trial does not afford American appellate courts anything close to a de novo 
consideration of the verdict on the basis of fuller information. 
A century ago, cases involving miscarriages of justice prompted the emergence 
in English law, and perhaps in American law also, of a broader form of criminal 
appeal than had been available via the writ of error.255  So also in recent years, a 
new crisis has undermined confidence in the capacity of the criminal adjudication 
system to distinguish the guilty from the innocent.  As a result of DNA testing, 
some 289 wrongly-convicted prisoners have been exonerated in the United 
States.256 
In many of the DNA-exoneration cases, the process of post-conviction judicial 
review ran its course without vacating the erroneous conviction, and the system of 
post-trial judicial review had no remaining mechanism available for examining a 
prisoner’s claim to be able to prove innocence through DNA evidence.257  Some 
scholars have argued that the American system of post-trial judicial review must, 
for that reason, be accounted largely a failure, at least by the criterion of whether 
the review corrects the erroneous convictions of innocent persons.258  Studies of the 
DNA-exoneration cases show that persons subsequently proven innocent fared no 
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better in the appellate process than do appellants generally.259  Absent some reform 
or supplementation of post-trial judicial review, it falls to the possibly uncertain 
hands of an executive authority, either in the person of a prosecutor who will drop 
the charges or a parole board that pardons or otherwise releases the prisoner, to end 
the unjust incarceration of the innocent.260 
The failure of the prior trials and appeals of the DNA-exonerated prisoners to 
vindicate their innocence has prompted calls for reform of American post-trial 
judicial review.261  Some scholars argue that appellate courts should henceforth 
review trial court findings of fact with much less deference.262  A reform of that 
sort has arrived in English appellate courts with the establishment of their power to 
review the facts and vacate a conviction deemed to be factually “unsafe.”263  In 
support of greater appellate scrutiny of jury fact-finding, it has been noted that 
“[e]mpirical research reveals that appellate courts in the United States uphold 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in up to half of all civil appeals—a rate that 
far exceeds such holdings in criminal cases.”264  The capacity for intensive 
appellate court review of the facts thus exists; only the will to apply it in criminal 
cases is presently lacking. 
A second, and perhaps narrower, response to the DNA-exoneration crisis has 
involved the creation of a new form of judicial review, usually focused specifically 
on DNA evidence.265  In 1999, only two states, New York and Illinois, had such 
statutes.266  Since then, such statutes have spread throughout the country, to the 
point that almost all states now have such a statute.267  Consistent with the 
American predilection for constraining post-trial review of jury factual findings, 
those statutes have restrictions that limit their availability and effectiveness as 
vehicles for the reconsideration of guilt in the face of a claim of provable 
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innocence.268  The range of prevalent restrictions includes a threshold showing of 
materiality that is often strictly construed,269 a limitation to DNA testing to the 
exclusion of other kinds of newly discovered evidence,270 limitations to prisoners 
convicted of certain serious crimes,271 a due diligence obligation with regard to the 
effort to obtain testing, and a bar on testing where defendants had pled guilty,272 
among other restrictions.273  The United States Supreme Court has held that there is 
no constitutional right to post-conviction access to prosecution evidence for the 
purpose of DNA testing.274 
In the post-trial judicial review of claims challenging the factual basis for the 
conviction, American courts are constrained by filing deadlines and obligations of 
deference to the jury and to the trial court.  Those rules limit the extent to which a 
court, engaged in the task of post-trial judicial review of a conviction, can vacate it 
on the ground of doubts about the prisoner’s guilt.  As a result of such constraints 
and restrictions, American “courts consistently have adopted more favorable 
standards of review for non-guilt-related claims than for those claims most likely to 
be tied to guilt and innocence.”275  By contrast, Finnish courts, engaged in the 
process of post-trial judicial review of a criminal conviction, do not operate under 
so many constraints with respect to their consideration of claims of factual 
innocence. 
3.  Claims of Factual Injustice Implicit in Procedural Claims 
In Finland, because substantive grounds for challenging a conviction do not 
implicate any principle of deference to the trial court, prisoners have no reason to 
develop and present procedural claims that conceal within them, or otherwise 
implicitly involve, a substantive challenge to the conviction.  In the United States, 
on the other hand, direct substantive challenges to convictions are disfavored and 
constrained because they are perceived as inviting the reviewing court to intrude on 
the province of the jury.  Consequently, prisoners have a reason to develop and 
present formally procedural claims that involve an inquiry into the substantive or 
factual accuracy of the conviction. 
Indeed, one need not necessarily regard such claims as subterfuges.  
Procedural claims and substantive claims do not exist in separate universes.276  If 
doubts truly exist about a convicted prisoner’s guilt, in a well-designed system of 
criminal adjudication, one might expect, and would hope, to find some procedural 
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or structural flaw in a trial that produced such a doubtful conviction.  By regulating 
the quality of the trial, therefore, the American appeal indirectly aims to assure the 
accuracy of the trial’s verdict.277  A procedurally and structurally flawless trial that 
produces an erroneous or doubtful verdict should be almost, if not entirely, a 
contradiction in terms.  As noted above, though, recent American experience seems 
to belie that hope, insofar as persons subsequently proven to be innocent fare no 
better in their appeals than do the class of appellants in general. 
It is perhaps, therefore, not surprising that the American system of post-trial 
judicial review has developed procedural or structural claims of error that amount 
almost to a direct inquiry into the prisoner’s guilt.  Three types of such claims exist.  
First, there are claims that the trial court erred in an evidentiary ruling, either by 
admitting prosecution evidence it should have excluded, or by excluding defense 
evidence it should have admitted.  Second, there are claims that the defense lawyer 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.278  Third, there are claims that the 
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense.279 
All three types of claims account for the trial’s erroneous outcome by 
reference to a defect in the information presented to the fact-finder.  That defect 
can consist either in the jury hearing and considering information it should not have 
had or in withholding from the jury some information it should have had.  
Considered from that point of view, the three claims differ only in their attribution 
of blame.  The first blames the trial judge for an improper ruling about the 
admission of an important item of evidence.  The second blames the defense lawyer 
for failing to fulfill the responsibility of zealous representation.  The third blames 
the State, usually the prosecutor or the police, for concealing material and 
exculpatory information. 
The three claims together likely amount to an American prisoner’s best 
opportunity for post-trial judicial review of the question of factual guilt.  However, 
even taken together, the three claims do not amount to a de novo review of the 
question of guilt.  One can readily imagine circumstances in which the parties are 
justifiably ignorant of important evidence at the time of trial.  In such cases, neither 
the prosecutor nor defense counsel can be faulted for failing to use or disclose that 
evidence, and if neither party proffers the evidence, the trial court will have made 
no ruling, erroneous or otherwise, on its admissibility. 
For example, techniques of scientific investigation may come into existence 
after trial that, when applied to evidence in the case, yield significantly new 
information.  The Troy Davis case arguably involves another example of such late 
discovered evidence, in the eyewitnesses who professed certain confidence in their 
identifications of Davis as the perpetrator at the time of trial, but afterwards 
disclose doubts.280  Otherwise, though, one or more of the three claims will provide 
the means for challenging a conviction, as the newly discovered evidence on which 
the defense relies on appeal will involve matters either known to the prosecution, or 
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reasonably knowable by the defense lawyer, or known to both and proffered, at the 
time of trial. 
Consistent with their function as vehicles for linking a procedural error with an 
erroneous outcome, all three claims require the prisoner to show, on appeal, that the 
error “prejudiced” the defense.  Thus, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, in addition to showing that the lawyer performed deficiently, the 
prisoner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”281  
An essentially identical standard applies to the review of claims that the State 
withheld exculpatory evidence.282  When adjudicating a claim of trial court error in 
the admission or exclusion of evidence, reviewing courts similarly consider 
whether the ruling “prejudiced” the defense.283  The claims thus share in common a 
standard of review.  Although phrased in terms that do not require the defendant to 
prove innocence to prevail, the standard of review does not amount, in theory or in 
practice, to a de novo reconsideration of guilt.  Rather, as the poor record of such 
claims when brought by subsequently-proven prisoners shows, “such procedural 
claims have not served well the goal of protecting innocent defendants from 
wrongful convictions.”284 
The claims share another similarity.  Although, as noted above, a showing of 
doubt about the prisoner’s guilt is necessary to the success of the claim, it is not 
sufficient.  In the case of a claim of trial court error in an evidentiary ruling, the 
court’s basis for the ruling must have been invalid.  In the case of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the prisoner will not prevail merely by showing 
that defense counsel did or failed to do some action that prejudiced the defense; the 
prisoner must further show that the judgment that motivated counsel’s decision was 
deficient.285  In the case of a claim that the prosecution withheld material and 
exculpatory evidence, the prisoner must show not only that the evidence was 
material and exculpatory, but also that the State had the information at the time of 
trial but did not disclose it.286 
Claims challenging the competency of defense counsel, or alleging the 
withholding by the State of exculpatory evidence, are almost, if not entirely, 
unknown to Finnish post-trial judicial review.287  Like American law, Finnish law 
recognizes a right to counsel that encompasses, for indigent criminal defendants, a 
right to the appointment of counsel.288  Several factors tend to diminish the 
frequency of claims made by Finnish defendants, relative to American defendants, 
that their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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First, unlike American criminal defendants, Finnish criminal defendants have a 
right to choose between the appointment of a legal services attorney and a private 
attorney.289  The fact that Finnish defendants may choose their attorneys likely 
diminishes the chance that, after trial, the Finnish defendant will feel dissatisfied 
with the attorney’s performance.  Second, Finnish courts tend to impose 
imprisonment much less often and for shorter periods than their American 
counterparts.  Finland has one of the world’s lowest rates of incarceration per 
capita.290  A defendant not subjected to the experience of incarceration is less likely 
than one who is to pursue an appeal to the extent of alleging the defense lawyer 
ineffective.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the qualities of the Finnish 
appeal tend to reduce the occasion for claims of ineffective assistance.  As already 
noted, the appeal offers convicted defendants the opportunity to present new 
evidence.  Thus, a defendant dissatisfied by a lawyer’s performance at trial in some 
respect can remedy it on appeal by presenting the case without the alleged defect. 
Finnish law also recognizes the possibility of claims alleging the production of 
false evidence at trial or the withholding by a witness of significant exculpatory 
evidence.291  It does not appear common, though, that the police or a prosecutor 
would withhold such evidence from the defense.  Finnish law establishes 
essentially an open-file policy, giving both prosecution and defense equal and full 
access to the police investigative file.292 
4.  Conclusions 
These considerations support some conclusions about American and Finnish 
regulation of the arguments prisoners may make during the post-trial judicial 
review of the conviction.  First, in the United States for the most part, post-trial 
judicial review of a conviction involves the adjudication of claims alleging error in 
the procedural or structural management of the trial, rather than in the trial’s 
outcome itself.  In that sense, one can say that, in the American system, the trial 
explores the issue of the defendant’s guilt; the post-trial judicial review explores 
the issue of the fairness of the trial.  Post-trial review does not repeat the trial 
court’s inquiry into the question of whether the defendant is in fact guilty of the 
crime charged.  In Finland, the opposite conclusion holds.  For the most part, post-
trial judicial review does not focus on the trial, but rather on the underlying 
question of the prisoner’s guilt. 
Second, in both systems, exceptions to each country’s primary orientation 
exist, as neither system has sustained a purely procedurally or purely factually 
oriented system of post-trial judicial review.  In the United States, prisoners can 
challenge the finding of guilt, but such claims are constrained by deadlines and by 
deference to the trial court’s fact-finding prerogative.  Claims combining a 
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procedural and substantive focus afford the reviewing court a greater freedom with 
regard to assessing the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt than do claims focused 
exclusively on the substantive justice of the conviction.  The recent development of 
DNA-specific post-trial judicial review constitutes a narrow form of substantive 
review, but within its scope, it affords reviewing courts authority to inquire into a 
prisoner’s claim of innocence.  In Finland, prisoners can make certain kinds of 
claims about trial procedures not connected directly with the adjudication of guilt, 
particularly if the claim raises a matter covered by the ECHR, or if the claim 
involves a matter not susceptible to correction in a de novo appeal. 
B.  Waiver of Claims of Error 
Both Finland and the United States have rules that enable courts engaged in 
post-trial judicial review of convictions to reject a challenge to a conviction 
regardless of the merits of the prisoner’s claims.  In the American system’s 
harmless error doctrine, we have already seen one mechanism by which a 
reviewing court can avoid deciding a claim challenging a ruling relating to trial 
structure or procedure.  Harmless error, though, constitutes a means for avoiding a 
procedural challenge to a conviction by reference to the conviction’s substantive 
justice.  In this section, the article considers mechanisms by which a post-trial 
reviewing court can avoid a procedural or substantive challenge to a conviction by 
reference to some other procedural value.  For example, in both countries, a 
prisoner’s failure to give timely notice of the intent to appeal a conviction can 
result in the rejection of an appeal without regard to the merits of the prisoner’s 
challenges. 
In Finland, filing deadlines constitute essentially the only mechanism available 
to reviewing courts to avoid deciding the merits of a prisoner’s claim.  Thus, a 
prisoner can lose the right to appeal by an untimely declaration of the intent to 
appeal.293  A prisoner can also lose the right to appeal by failing to appear at the 
appeal hearing.294  However, Finnish courts do not necessarily enforce those rules 
rigidly.  A defendant who can show an excuse for failing to meet the filing 
deadlines can obtain merits review of the case.295 
American courts, on the other hand, tend to enforce filing deadlines fairly 
rigidly.  In Bowles v. Russell,296 for example, a federal judge informed a habeas 
petitioner, in the presence of the State’s counsel, that the petitioner had seventeen 
days, until February 27, to file a notice of appeal, when in fact the law permitted 
only fourteen days.297  Bowles filed his notice on February 26.  The appeals court 
then found Bowles’s notice untimely, and dismissed his appeal.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed that ruling.298  More recently, the Supreme Court has marked an 
outer limit to the strictness of application of filing deadlines, at least in cases in 
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which the petitioner’s counsel abandons the petitioner’s case without so informing 
the petitioner, and for that reason a deadline is missed.299 
Finland allows the re-opening of cases in the extraordinary review process, 
even after a significant period of time has passed since the trial and initial appeal.  
For example, in one case, two defendants convicted of theft had lost their case in 
the court of appeals in 1996.300  After the passage of some years, and after Finnish 
law had been amended to strengthen the right of defendants to examine the 
witnesses against them, the defendants initiated an extraordinary appeal on the 
grounds that they had not been permitted to question certain prosecution witnesses.  
The Finnish Supreme Court agreed, annulled the conviction, and ordered the case 
to be retried in the district court.  Beyond timing rules, Finland does not impose 
waiver rules that allow an appellate court to reject an appeal without regard to its 
merit. 
The situation in the United States differs.  At every phase of post-trial judicial 
review of a criminal conviction, waiver rules exist.  In important respects, the idea 
of waiver of challenges is fundamental to the American system of criminal 
adjudication. 
The availability and prevalence of plea bargaining is perhaps a central defining 
feature of the American system of criminal adjudication.301  Certainly, far more 
cases are adjudicated by guilty plea in the United States than are adjudicated by 
trial.302  By pleading guilty, a defendant waives the right to adversarial adjudication 
and waives many of the claims of innocence and of procedural or structural error 
that might otherwise form the basis of post-trial judicial review.  Many courts hold 
that a defendant who pleads guilty can only seek post-plea judicial review of claims 
that allege some improper influence or other defect in the plea process.303 
The possibility of instituting some limited version of plea bargaining is under 
consideration in Finland.304  At present, though, while a defendant’s willingness to 
confess guilt may certainly simplify the trial, it does not avoid the trial’s 
necessity.305  Finland does not now have any procedure, other than trial, by which a 
court can enter a criminal conviction. 
Even for those American defendants who plead not guilty and stand trial, 
waiver rules constitute a pervasive limitation on each phase of post-trial judicial 
review.  On direct appeal, a prisoner may not raise any claim not “preserved” in the 
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trial court.306  That rule imposes on defendants an obligation to raise their factual 
and legal arguments in the first instance in the trial court.  If a defendant has not so 
preserved the claim in the trial court, the defendant cannot make the argument in 
the appellate court. 
In many states, appellate courts recognize a “plain error” exception to that rule 
of non-reviewability of unpreserved claims.307  However, the significance of that 
plain error exception is limited by the fact that it permits the appellate court to 
grant relief to the appealing defendant only in rare circumstances.  A typical 
formulation of the doctrine notes that the plain error rule “should be used sparingly, 
its use limited to those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result.”308  As understood by the United States Supreme Court, the 
doctrine has four elements: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain; 
(3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must seriously affect 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.309  Thus, many 
claims that would have prevailed if the defendant had raised them in the trial court 
will not prevail on plain error review unless the error was unusually egregious and 
prejudicial. 
Waiver rules continue to influence the claims available in state post-conviction 
proceedings.  First, as a general matter, post-conviction courts will not review 
claims previously made and adjudicated during direct appeal.310  In effect, by 
having previously raised the claim, the prisoner loses the right to raise it again in 
post-conviction proceedings.  This limitation avoids the waste of time and effort 
perceived to be inherent in relitigating claims already decided. 
Second, courts engaged in state post-conviction review often will decline to 
address claims that could have been, but were not, presented on direct appeal.311  
This rule creates an incentive on the part of the defendant to raise all available 
claims at the earliest possible opportunity, for fear of losing the right to raise a 
claim if not previously raised. 
As a result of those two rules, state post-conviction review is reserved for 
claims that neither were, nor should have been, raised at trial or on direct appeal.  
To fit within that description, a claim must arise out of circumstances excusably 
unknown or otherwise unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial.  In 
American criminal procedure, such claims tend to take one of three forms, the first 
two of which involve facts not available to the defendant before the conclusion of 
direct appeal, and the third of which involves rules of law not available to the 
defendant until the conclusion of direct appeal. 
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The most common factual claim reserved for post-conviction proceedings is 
the allegation of ineffective assistance of trial or of appellate counsel.312  On 
occasion, claims of ineffective assistance arise out of state interference in the 
relationship between defense counsel and the defendant.313  In those instances, no 
obstacle exists to the presentation of the claim at trial and on direct appeal, and the 
procedural bar restricting post-conviction review would apply.  Most ineffective 
assistance claims, though, involve circumstances which reflect badly on defense 
counsel’s preparation or performance.314  In recognition of the fact that defense 
lawyers cannot be expected or required to allege or prove themselves to have 
performed incompetently, the law understands that a defendant has no obligation to 
raise that claim while represented by the allegedly ineffective lawyer.315  Such 
claims get litigated in state post-conviction proceedings. 
The second typical post-conviction claim arises under the due process 
guarantee associated with the decision in Brady v. Maryland.316  Such claims arise 
when, after trial, the defense discovers that the prosecution possessed exculpatory 
information it did not disclose in time to be used at trial.  Necessarily, if the 
defendant was faultlessly ignorant at trial about the facts underlying the claim, no 
reasonable objection can be made to the defendant’s making such a claim for the 
first time in state post-conviction review. 
The two claims described above do not necessarily exhaust the possibilities of 
post-conviction claims arising out of facts excusably unknown to the defendant at 
the time of trial.  However, to fall within the safe space between the two procedural 
bars, any such claim must arise from facts the defendant neither knew, nor could 
reasonably be expected to know, at the time of the trial. 
The other variety of post-conviction claim involves matters of law excusably 
unknown to the defense at the time of the trial.  Here, only one situation fits that 
description: the circumstance in which the legislature has enacted, or a court has 
recognized, a rule of law that would benefit the defendant but was not 
acknowledged or enacted at the time of the defendant’s trial.  American law has 
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developed principles to determine when such subsequent developments in the law 
should be applied retroactively in the case of a defendant.317 
Finally, waiver rules also constrain the review of federal habeas courts.  The 
“exhaustion” requirement obliges a state prisoner to present any federal law claim 
in state court before presenting it in federal court.318  The doctrine of independent 
and adequate state law grounds obliges a federal court to reject an otherwise 
meritorious claim if the state court previously rejected it on a ground other than its 
merits, such as a failure to preserve it at trial or to comply with a post-trial filing 
deadline.319  The statute of limitations applicable to the filing of federal habeas 
petitions obliges a federal court to reject otherwise meritorious claims if they were 
filed a day too late.320  The restriction on the filing of a second federal habeas 
petition obliges a federal court to reject otherwise meritorious claims presented in 
such a petition if the claim was already presented in a prior federal petition.321  
Even new claims may not be presented in successive petitions except in narrow 
circumstances.322 
Several considerations motivate the existence of that set of waiver rules.  First, 
the rules serve at each stage of post-trial judicial review to privilege the prior stage.  
The rule requiring preservation at trial, when regularly applied by appellate courts 
on direct appeal, creates an incentive for defendants to present their claims at trial, 
at the cost of losing the opportunity to present them in the direct appeal, except 
under the unfavorable plain error standard.  The post-conviction rule barring the 
litigation of claims that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal 
creates an incentive to raise the claim on direct appeal, at the cost of losing the 
opportunity to present it later.  The exhaustion rule and the adequate and 
independent state law doctrine, applied in federal habeas, create incentives for 
litigants to raise claims in state court proceedings, at the cost of losing the 
opportunity to raise them in federal habeas.  Finally, the special disadvantages 
associated with a second, or “successive,” habeas petition creates an incentive for 
the prisoner to raise all federal claims in the first habeas petition. 
Second, in addition to creating incentives to raise claims at the earliest 
opportunity, the waiver rules have the effect of protecting the trial verdict, by 
increasing the likelihood that it will be upheld.  Throughout the process of post-trial 
judicial review, a reviewing court has at least three ways to reject a claim of error.  
First, the claim can be rejected on its merits because the trial court did not err.  
Second, the claim can be rejected because, although the trial court did err, that error 
was harmless in light of all the evidence of the prisoner’s guilt.  Third, the claim 
can be rejected, even though meritorious and harmful, if the prisoner waived the 
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claim by failing to comply with some procedural requirement defining the claim’s 
proper presentation.  As a result of their tendency to protect the jury verdict, waiver 
rules can interfere with the capacity of courts engaged in post-trial judicial review 
of criminal convictions to correct errors.  Scholars concerned that the American 
system is failing have accordingly suggested reform of waiver rules.323 
Third, waiver rules tend to reduce the costs of post-trial judicial review.  When 
the prosecution has more than one argument which, if successful, would defeat an 
appeal, a reviewing court need not assess all of the arguments.  Rather, the court 
can rely on the one that most readily and simply justifies rejecting the appeal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION324 
A prudent comparative legal analysis proceeds modestly and cautiously when 
the moment comes for drawing conclusions: 
The job of the comparatist is not simply to compare rules since these are 
nothing more than . . . the surface appearance of law. . . .  [W]hat the 
comparatist must do is get below their surface in order to discover the 
cultural mentalité that these rules express.  It is not the rule itself that 
should be the focus of comparison but what the rule signifies in terms of 
the political, social, economic and ideological context from which it has 
emerged.325 
To understand the meaning of the differences between American and Finnish post-
trial judicial review, then, one must look for the underlying policies that have 
produced those differences.  In short, the task of the comparatist is to make the 
familiar strange, and thereby visible. 
The effort begins by identifying general principles by which to measure 
variations between Finnish and American procedures.  Any democracy’s system of 
criminal procedure confronts the challenge of embodying and reconciling four 
fundamental goals.  First, criminal procedure seeks to discover the truth about the 
particular events that led to the criminal charges.  Other things being equal, a 
democracy’s criminal procedure prefers a rule that best promotes the accuracy of 
that truth-seeking function.  Second, criminal procedure aims to respect the rights 
and dignity of people involved in criminal cases.  Third, systems of criminal 
adjudication operate in a competitive environment, in the sense that other social 
and governmental priorities compete for resources with the court system.  As a 
consequence, considerations of efficiency, as measured in terms of the required 
expenditures of money and/or time, can prove important to the evaluation of any 
given rule of criminal procedure.  Fourth, in democracies, public confidence in the 
criminal justice system matters.  A criminal justice system should not only be fair 
and just: it should also appear to be fair and just. 
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Within any system of criminal procedure, conflicts between the four goals can 
arise.  Rare is the rule of criminal procedure that improves on any possible 
alternative rule on every criterion.  A legal system’s resolution of such conflicts can 
reveal something fundamental about that system’s values, and a comparison of two 
legal systems’ different choices can likewise prove revealing.  One can describe a 
system’s enacted rules as “just formalistic shadows of the policy considerations 
that underlie them.”326  Caution is called for, however, in interpreting differences in 
enacted rules as reflecting different policy considerations.  Ideally, democratic 
societies choose their rules of procedure advisedly, aware of relevant alternative 
choices and of the implications of the options.  In that ideal situation, the direct 
consequences of procedural rules are intended, or at least anticipated and 
understood, and the enacted rules reflect different value judgments.327 
However, even in democracies, that ideal situation may not exist in fact.  
Because of the enduring influence of history and legal tradition, at any given time 
there may be no “necessary logical connection between legal rules, institutions and 
structures on the one hand, and the society in which they operate on the other.”328  
In addition to tradition, a number of other obstacles can intervene between 
community values and procedural rules, such as would undermine the validity of 
the assumption that the consequences of the rules are intended and understood.  For 
example, rules of criminal procedure may reflect the values not of the community 
as a whole, but only of the subset of the community that has won the power to 
enact procedural rules.  With those caveats in mind, some tentative conclusions can 
be drawn on the basis of the observed similarities and differences between the 
Finnish and the American systems of post-trial judicial review of criminal 
convictions. 
Let us first consider the provisions and compromises each system makes with 
respect to the goal of accuracy.  Finland does not require courts engaged in post-
trial review of convictions to employ deferential standards of review in the 
consideration of issues of fact.  In the absence of such deference, the focus of 
Finnish post-trial review remains where it was in the trial: on the factual truth of 
the charge.  The Finnish system does not regard lay participation in adjudication as 
endowed with such special importance as to justify protecting it from non-
deferential reconsideration.  Rather, Finland’s provision of multiple opportunities 
for de novo reconsideration of guilt through the structures of direct and 
extraordinary review bespeaks a belief that, by repetitive inquiry through the 
hierarchy of courts, the last examination shall be at least the equal in quality to the 
first. 
By contrast, the United States requires courts engaged in post-trial review of a 
conviction to enter upon the task in a spirit of substantial deference to the trial court 
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fact-finder.  From the point of view of accuracy, the American choice reflects 
either a faith in the unique superiority of trial court fact-finders (most often jurors), 
or a compromise of the value of accuracy for the sake of other ends. 
Two possible concerns about professional judges as fact-finders could justify a 
belief in the fact-finding superiority of laypersons.  First, professionals may, 
through experience, suffer a degradation in their ability to find facts if, for example, 
repeated exposure to cases leads professional judges to form stereotypical beliefs 
about certain kinds of cases.  Professional judges, having formed such stereotypical 
beliefs, may be relatively blind to the possibility that the particular case under 
adjudication may not justify the stereotypical conclusion.  Second, professionals 
may perhaps be more subject to venal corruption than laypersons. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which these concerns are justified in 
American circumstances.  One reads occasionally of cases of judicial corruption, 
but such cases seem quite rare under current American circumstances, and 
particularly so in appellate courts.329  With regard to the other possible concern, one 
can perhaps make a strong case that stereotypical thinking is at least as likely to 
skew the deliberations of novice laypersons as professional judges.  Indeed, 
professional judges may, by experience, perceive patterns genuinely relevant to 
fact-finding that inexperienced laypersons will fail to note.330  Ultimately, given the 
willingness of American courts in post-trial review of civil cases to engage in less 
deferential review, and the persuasive criticisms that have been made against the 
claim that jurors always possess a unique competency as fact-finders, it would 
seem that, whatever we may tell ourselves, our principle of mandated deference to 
the jury’s fact-finding reflects a compromise of the goal of accuracy in the service 
of other ends.331 
Indeed, in the American tradition, we do, in the principle of jury nullification, 
acknowledge at least one value for which we sacrifice the accuracy associated with 
judicial adjudication in favor of a desired inaccuracy associated with jury 
adjudication.  In the United States, the right to trial by jury took shape in part as a 
bulwark against the use of criminal prosecution as an instrument of political 
repression.332  Through nullification, the jury disregards the factual truth of 
allegations, and acts on what it regards as higher political values. 
With respect to sensitivity to the value of efficiency, we find the American 
system more keen than Finland’s.333  In offering repeated opportunities for the 
presentation of evidence and for the reconsideration of factual issues previously 
addressed, Finnish post-trial judicial review contemplates significant duplication of 
effort.  American courts, by contrast, tend to seek to avoid duplication of effort. 
When confronted with a choice between possible rules for a given situation, 
American courts often take note of the possibility that a given ruling will invite an 
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unmanageable deluge of claims.334  By restricting the presentation of evidence to 
trial-level courts, the American system allows appellate courts to handle many 
more cases at present staffing levels than would be possible if litigants could 
present new evidence on appeal.  Through its principle of deference and its waiver 
rules, the American system privileges earlier phases of post-trial judicial review 
over later phases, thereby requiring the earliest possible presentation of a claim and 
avoiding duplication, especially of inquiries into the factual accuracy of the truth.  
The American system does not altogether lack duplication; our federal system 
gives federal claims, at least, a hearing both in state and federal courts, albeit a 
federal hearing that is increasingly deferential to the state court decision.  Aside 
from that federalism-motivated caveat, one finds in the American system a 
pronounced emphasis on finality – the avoidance of duplication – in criminal 
adjudication.335 
The Supreme Court has often emphasized society’s interest in the finality of 
criminal convictions.336  In Herrera, the Court made the point thus: 
Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.  The guilt 
or innocence determination in state criminal trials is a decisive and 
portentous event.  Society’s resources have been concentrated at that time 
and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the 
question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.  Few rulings would be 
more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas 
review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.337 
With regard to the value of respect for human rights, we see many features 
shared by the United States and Finland.  To the extent that the right to appeal a 
conviction is itself a human right, that right is now well-established in both 
countries.  Both countries appoint counsel to represent indigent persons on appeal.  
Finland recognizes victims as having the status of parties in criminal cases and in 
criminal appeals, and to that extent, the Finnish system manifests a broader vision 
of human rights than does the American.338  On the other hand, the rule in the 
United States barring prosecution appeals of acquittals reveals a particular 
sensitivity to the predicament faced by an accused defendant, and a determination 
not to prolong that predicament beyond an acquittal at trial.  Otherwise,  the precise 
structure and content of appellate procedure does not very much implicate broader 
concepts of human rights. 
With regards to the last criterion—the goal of enhancing the public reputation 
of the criminal adjudication system—one finds rather more to say.  Here, perhaps, 
we find the explanation for the privileged position of the jury in the American 
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system.339  Post-trial judicial review of criminal convictions in the United States 
reflects the fact that, in the United States, the prestige and public reputation of the 
system requires some substantial lay participation which professional judges, 
however individually well qualified, cannot supply.  
The explanation finds support in a long American tradition of suspicion of 
expertise.  In the years after American independence, some trial judges would 
instruct jurors in terms explicitly hostile to expertise, as in the following New 
Hampshire example: 
They [the lawyers] talk of law.  Why, gentlemen, it is not law we want, 
but justice.  They would govern us by the common law of England.  Trust 
me, gentlemen, Common sense is a much safer guide for us . . . . A clear 
head and an honest heart are worth more than all the law of all the 
lawyers.340 
That tradition endures: 
Americans are and have always been credulous sceptics.  They question 
the authority of priests, then talk to the dead; they second-guess their 
cardiologists, then seek out quacks in the jungle.  Like people in every 
society, they do this in moments of crisis when things seem hopeless.  
They also, unlike people in other societies, do it on the general principle 
that expertise and authority are inherently suspect.341 
In Finland, concerns about the possibility of venal corruption are unlikely to 
influence the construction of the system of post-trial judicial review, as Finland 
regularly ranks among the least corrupt societies on the planet.342  Equally 
inapplicable, perhaps, is the concern that with expertise comes cynicism or 
stereotypical thinking.  In Finland, distrust for authority and expertise may be less 
prevalent and faith in the wisdom of laymen less widespread. 
We close then with an understanding of the Finnish system as relatively more 
exclusively focused on achieving accurate results, even at some cost in terms of 
efficiency.  We see also a system relatively less dependent on the participation of 
laypersons for its public legitimacy.  In the United States, concerns about costs and 
about legitimacy have greater influence over the system of post-trial judicial review 
of convictions.  Costs matter in the country that incarcerates a larger proportion of 
its population than any other.  By recent measures, the United States incarcerates 
732 people per 100,000 population; Finland incarcerates 64 per 100,000.343 
One might surmise that a system that so values efficiencies and public 
confidence, to the extent even of compromising its pursuit of the goal of accuracy, 
                                                                                                                 
 339. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985). 
 340. LYNN WARREN TURNER, THE NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S FORMATIVE YEARS 108 
(1983). 
 341. Mark Lilla, The Tea Party Jacobins, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, vol. 57, No. 9, May 27, 2010, at 56. 
 342. See Finland Joint Second Least Corrupt Company, YLE (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/news/2011/12/finland_joint_second_least_corrupt_country_3071537.html. 
 343. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2010 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf; ROY 
WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8TH EDITION) (2009), 
available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
476 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2 
does so because the system consumes enormous resources and because it does not 
enjoy unquestioned public confidence.  Finland’s willingness to permit 
reconsideration on appeal bespeaks a legal system not so overwhelmed by costs, 
and not dependent, for public confidence, on the involvement of laypersons.  Some 
corroboration of those assessments would appear in the fact that Finland has been 
reducing the role of lay judges, and does not operate a criminal justice system that 
involves nearly so large a proportion of its population as the American system. 
These conclusions must remain tentative.  A comparison of other aspects of the 
Finnish and American systems of criminal adjudication could substantiate, or call 
into doubt, these hypotheses.344  Comparisons with the systems employed in other 
countries would surely also enrich our understanding of the Finnish and American 
systems.  Much remains to be done before the premises, hidden assumptions, and 
purposes of each country’s system of criminal procedure stand fully revealed. 
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